GOVERNMENT AS RESCUE FINANCIER: NOT
JUST A PRIVATE LENDER
Marc J. Heimowitz*
In recent years, U.S. government entities have become increasingly
active as commercial participants in corporate restructurings by providing
rescue loans when private market funding is unavailable. Like private
lenders, the government can effectively control the operations of distressed
enterprises, the manner of their reorganizations, and the distribution of
value to their existing stakeholders by positioning and conditioning these
loans. Unlike private, purely commercial actors who act with pecuniary
motives, the government intervenes to force distinctly regulatory or
political outcomes. This article initially explores whether existing laws and
informal restructuring standards, practices, and policies provide an
appropriate framework to evaluate conduct of an ostensibly commercial
government actor that in fact is not acting to maximize return on its narrow
rescue investment. It concludes that the insertion of non-commercial
behavior into what typically is an economic framework creates uncertainty
for private investors and that both investors and the government would
benefit if restructuring outcomes were more predictable.
Without
challenging the propriety of government policy goals, this article also
offers simple and actionable ways to improve process predictability and
certainty while preserving government flexibility to act as the lender of last
resort.
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INTRODUCTION
Every successful reorganization requires liquidity. Even a patently
balance-sheet solvent enterprise cannot reorganize unless it can pay its
debts as they come due, together with the current costs of financial and
operational restructuring. In many complex restructurings there is
immediate need to borrow substantial funds to preserve going-concern
value or to enable an arms-length realization of value through orderly
liquidation. Liquidity is particularly needed when the entity being
reorganized is a provider of credit to customers or counterparties or when
counterparties will not do business without a clear showing of liquidity and
evident credit quality.
Absent unusual contractual or statutory imperatives, the general rule is
that disinterested parties cannot be compelled to lend funds to an entity in
exigent circumstances. Consequently, rescue lenders must be induced to
provide funds. Like conventional debt, rescue loan terms will depend on
the perceived riskiness of the new loan, the lender’s cost of capital, and the
vigor of market competition. However, rescue loans often are perceived to
be extraordinarily or unusually risky, and many traditional sources of
funding are not available to stressed or distressed companies. Also, the
types of lenders who provide rescue financing (other than on an assetbacked basis) frequently have high return thresholds, and market
competition among parties willing to price restructuring process risk is
typically less robust than competition for regular-way lending.
Compounding these issues, there also can be structural impediments to
competition such as existing secured creditors who object to alternative
sources or terms of rescue financing.
In bankruptcy, private debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lenders who are
not subject to material competition often have the ability to set the contours
of a restructuring through contract. DIP lenders may be able to force the
sale of a company, or company assets, over creditor objection, cause a
company to operate only in a permitted manner, and/or significantly adjust
distribution of recovery on account of pre-existing claims and interests. At
the extreme, DIP lenders may have the practical ability to compel a
particular restructuring process or specific distributional outcome by
conditioning financial support upon debtor acceptance and court approval.
Essentially, a distressed corporate enterprise that absolutely, positively
must borrow funds may have little or no bargaining power when
negotiating with a well-positioned DIP lender.
Restructuring professionals understand and generally accept the
proposition that when there is no better alternative even odious private
rescue financing should be accepted on proffered terms. Private DIP lender
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leverage is not wholly unconstrained, however. Codified and common law,
coupled with informal restructuring standards, practices, and policies, have
evolved over decades to limit economic overreach by private actors.
Parties in interest can challenge loan terms that are not economically
prudent or equitable, or which are not in-line with market conditions. They
can highlight management bias, deficient decision-making, breach of
fiduciary duty, and poor process. They can object to DIP lender conduct
undertaken with improper commercial purpose. And, in a final line of
defense, objecting stakeholders typically are given an option to substitute
their own funds in lieu of proffered or approved rescue financing.1
The bankruptcy process (including pre-petition negotiations in
anticipation of bankruptcy) creates healthy tension between DIP lenders,
stakeholders, and debtors, and focuses attention on egregious DIP lender
demands. In a private DIP context, both fiduciaries in control of corporate
debtors and lenders are constrained by the prospect of reasoned judicial
review of their conduct and in many cases by reputational risk. All parties
understand that there is at least a palpable chance that a judge will bluepencil objectionable loan terms under threat of rejection or the debtor will
be compelled to reject financing and reevaluate the nature and scope of
restructuring. Disinclined debtors or objecting stakeholders may not
always be able to block or modify an undesired private loan but
restructuring outcomes are reasonably predictable and bounded based on
past pattern and practice.
In the non-corporate context, banks and thrifts are resolved in
accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”). The FDIA
confers extensive authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) to sit as conservator or receiver of an intervened bank, and to
provide rescue funding in support of reorganization or orderly liquidation.
The FDIA is a resolution process that practitioners and investors
1. Experienced market participants will admit that the “option” to provide alternative
financing is not always exercisable. Even if a deal is shopped to exhaustion, allowing for a
good faith process to raise capital and sufficient time, a stakeholder may face
insurmountable practical hurdles to raising capital. Disorganization, including poor
coordination and disagreement among creditors, is a common impediment. The proffered
DIP lender may have an insurmountable competitive edge due to asymmetric information or
company support. Junior creditors may be unable to raise DIP financing on a junior lien
basis, to win or afford to wage a priming fight, to accumulate enough capital to take out
senior claims, or to object at all except at risk of breach of inter-creditor contract. Some
senior secured creditors may find themselves excluded from and futilely fighting a DIP loan
offered by a subset of the same class. Alternatively, the amount of rescue capital needed
might be disproportionately large compared to the market value of the existing investment.
Still, it is unusual for a DIP lender to provide funds substantially below market, and most
courts likely would be hostile to a prospective DIP lender who refuses to acknowledge
alternative terms and market conditions.
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understand relatively well even though the statute itself allows for
extensive exercise of FDIC discretion, minimal court supervision, and
theoretically disparate outcomes across cases. Investors reasonably can
predict how banks will be resolved because the FDIC in its capacity as
banking resolution authority follows transparent rules and regulations that
have been applied consistently over time. The FDIC (and the nowabolished Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) and
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”)) have set common law and
regulatory precedent through the resolution of literally thousands of banks
and thrifts.2 In addition, investors expect that, as a class, domestic banks
and thrifts will be subject to pervasive and industry-wide regulation, and
the same statutory resolution regime.3
When the U.S. government4 provides rescue financing to a corporate
enterprise, whether under the supervision of a bankruptcy court in a
resolution proceeding modeled after the FDIA and adapted for corporate
distress, or under imminent threat of either insolvency regime, formal legal
rules and protocol are followed but the process is hollow and does not
materially constrain government conduct. The circumstances of public
intervention and purpose of providing government-funded financing are
grossly different from that in the private lender context. Strict adherence to
legalistic frameworks without adjusting for different circumstances and
lender motives can undermine investor confidence in resolution processes
and lead to suboptimal substantive outcomes.
Initially, the terms and conditions of government loans at the
magnitude and scope of too-big-to-fail or industry-wide lending programs
2. The FDIC also has self-limited by regulation and conduct, and has developed a
pattern and practice over many years. There are FDIC rules and regulations, advisory
opinions, statements of policy, an “FDIC Resolution Handbook,” and multiple speeches and
press releases relating to interventions.
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/index.html [https://perma.cc/48YB-KEKQ]; https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/rules/2000-50.html [https://perma.cc/764G-SVYR] (outlining rules and
regulations);
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-50.html
[https://perma.cc/KP76-PKUY]
(displaying
advisory
opinions);
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-100.html [https://perma.cc/JN75-69HL]
(stating FDIC statements of policy); https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/
[https://perma.cc/7TD5-6RSR] (displaying Resolutions Handbook).
3. Technically, a state chartered savings and loan association or bank may be resolved
by the state regulatory authority but “state regulatory authorities virtually always request the
appointment of the FDIC when a receiver is appointed.” See FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS,
CHAPTER 8: THE FDIC’S ROLE AS RECEIVER, 215, https://www.fdic.gov/
bank/historical/managing/history1-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HXT-VNQW].
4. Rescue financing can be provided by various federal government agencies or
vehicles. For purposes of this article the source of financing does not matter because
authority to lend is presumed and inter-agency conflict is not at issue, except where
specified.
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are invariably unconstrained by private market competition.5 The single
most important constraint on lender behavior – market competition – is
missing. Moreover, the very fact of government intervention presumes the
recipient enterprise is of sufficient size and general importance to warrant
federal attention. Government claims that disorderly business failure will
lead to systemic harm, or conversely that going-concern restructuring or
orderly liquidation is in the public interest, are all but impossible to rebut.
In addition, a public lender may intervene with valid policy or
political objectives that override or even contradict the normal private
lender’s overarching goal to protect its commercial interest and maximize
profitability.6 The baseline investor expectation is that government
agencies will be viewed by courts, the public, and government officials, as
justifiably entitled to condition rescue financing on public policy terms.
The government, as a reluctant actor and repository of the public trust,
essentially has an elbow on the scale. Existing formal and informal
restructuring rules are not suited to restrict government conduct in a
meaningful way, or to ferret out ulterior policy or political motives behind
5. In 2008 and 2009, when risk capital was scarce and pro-cyclically expensive, even
small private rescue loans not at material risk of default were difficult to arrange at useful
cost. The amount of rescue funding the government provided during the financial crisis
could not have been raised in private capital or bank loan markets in a similarly short timeframe, under any market conditions.
6. Entities sufficiently large or systemically important to have garnered emergency
government support – banks and other financial institutions, mortgage guarantors, insurance
providers, and top-tier industrial corporations – presumably were worthy of intervention
because disorderly liquidation might have caused material disruption to the economy,
employment, or other strategic interests. Non-commercial goals furthered by the terms and
conditions of government support once made could include subsidization, development,
value transfer, electoral politics, signaling policy change, or any of a myriad of other policy
or political goals.
At the same time, it would be unfair to say that government lends to lose money.
Agencies presumably will attempt to structure rescue financing to protect taxpayers from
loss or ostensibly to earn a return commensurate with risk, however risk is perceived,
provided the commercial goal does not conflict with an overriding policy or political goal.
In most cases the government does not appear meaningfully motivated to initiate rescue
financing in order to maximize profit, as would a disinterested private lender. Although
deliberately punitive DIP terms may have a wealth maximizing effect, profit motive may be
incidental to policy goals (such as signaling disproportionate loss to avoid future moral
hazard) or political goals. However, there is a vigorous debate and extant litigation over
whether the terms of government support for the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) have
been amended for the purpose of seizing assets and maximizing federal revenues. For a
brief overview of the dispute surrounding the controversial “Net Worth Sweep” see
generally BETHANY MCLEAN, SHAKY GROUND: THE STRANGE SAGA OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE
GIANTS (2015) (noting in part that the Treasury may have changed the terms of its preferred
stock purchase agreement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to sweep profits and
avoid debt ceiling limitations).
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the terms and conditions of rescue financing.
The ordinary corporate resolution process in bankruptcy is designed to
limit commercial overreach by private lenders acting to enhance their own
economic self-interests. Core investor concerns about unpredictability of
government loan terms and conditions are not rooted in voracity. Rather,
the risks are that the government will condition funding in ways that
antithetically diminish estate value or change distributions to benefit a
party other than the government as lender. Unless it were in its own
economic self-interest, a third-party private lender would not be expected
to condition funds on a particular transfer of assets, liabilities, or value
from the estate, on a change in priority of distribution, on disparate
treatment of similarly situated stakeholders, or on a change in corporate
governance that does not enhance value of the estate.
Investors face additional risks when a corporate group is restructured
or liquidated under an agency controlled resolution scheme such as Title II
of the Dodd-Frank Act,7 rather than in bankruptcy or under threat of
bankruptcy.
Stakeholders lack the automatic judicial venue and
transparency afforded by a bankruptcy court under restructuring constructs
deliberately designed to mimic the bank resolution process. There is no
court that entertains process or predetermination objections to loan terms
and conditions, or notionally checks that the estate is well-served by the
loan. Indeed, investors do not expect terms and conditions of rescue
financing will be subject to prior objection at all, and may not even be
publicly known for some time.
Worse, there is no disinterested manager or trustee in control of the
borrower tasked with negotiating the terms and conditions of the loan
strictly on behalf of the estate. The entity responsible for negotiating on
behalf of the estate is a government agency appointed as conservator or
receiver. That government conservator or receiver may be statutorily
tasked with goals beyond maximization of value available to stakeholders,
equitable distribution of value, or restoration to financial solvency. In
addition, that government conservator or receiver may be deeply conflicted.
In some cases the government agency placed in charge of the borrower
actually regulates the borrowing entity and its counterparties and
competitors.8 In all cases the government agency is part of the same
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5381 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank Act”).
8. This is the normal dual role played by the FDIC in bank resolutions. The courts
and the FDIC itself recognize this duality not just in practice but in nomenclature. See, e.g.,
Anchor Savings Bank v. U.S.A, Fed Cl. Ct. No. 95-39 C May 18, 2015, at 28 (noting that
“[t]he FDIC plays a dual role: in its corporate capacity (“FDIC-C”), it acts as insurer,
regulator and supervisor of FDIC insured banks. But the FDIC also acts as receiver (“FDICR”) for failed national banks and federal thrifts that have been seized”). Investor acceptance
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federal government that both regulates the entity and provides the
financing, under actual common control or the appearance of common
control. And, compounding lack of transparency and accountability,
statutorily-valid actions of public conservators or receivers typically are
subject only to restricted judicial review and may be explicitly immune
from injunctive relief.
Given this backdrop, there is a veneer of legitimacy and fairness when
the government, acting in a commercial capacity as rescue financier,
conditions support on a particular restructuring process or outcome. It is
legally challenging (and it has been empirically unsuccessful) to argue that
government loans should be examined differently than private DIP loans,
despite different conditions and lender motives. Ironically, past patterns
and practices leave investors with a foreseeable bankruptcy process – the
government will be able to condition its loan as desired because a private
DIP lender presumably could do the same – but outcomes are uncertain
because there is no way to predict how the government, as a non-economic
actor, will exercise discretion. Likewise, an FDIA-type resolution process
for nonbank corporations may appear familiar but lack necessary informal
controls, checks, and balances in a different context. In the banking
context there is little need for investors to be concerned about how the
FDIC will borrow from itself,9 or for investors to expect commercial
overreach beyond what already is understood from rules, regulations and
precedent. Observance of formal legal process offers a veneer of investor
protection but no actual safeguard against commercial overreach or
pretextual government behavior.
Regardless of whether government actions in fact are legal (or simply
that the government can act without meaningful opposition or judicial
review), there is significant policy risk when the government conditions
rescue financing as if it were a private actor. There are principled reasons
to self-limit government exercise of discretion. When making rescue loans
of this dual role when resolving banks does not mean either that investors agree that the
practice is appropriate for resolution of nonbank corporations or that investors understand
how a dual role would or does work in practice for a non-bank, non-insurer, or non-railroad.
9. In practice, there is negligible or no negotiation over payment terms and conditions
of funds advanced by the FDIC, in part because general creditors (and junior claims and
interests) can only expect to receive payment if the FDIC is repaid in full. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(11) (setting forth the order of priority for payments in receivership); see also 12
U.S.C. § 1821(g) (providing for the subrogation of the FDIC to all depositor rights to the
extent of payment or assumption). The real negotiations over subsidization or support
typically concern the economic terms of loss-sharing with a healthy acquiring bank or asset
purchaser. In addition, the FDIC is the only government agency expected to fund bank
resolutions. If self-funding is inadequate, the agency, not the bailed-out entity, is
backstopped by the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”).
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or enforcing contractual terms, government officials wear commercial hats
and have commensurate commercial rights and responsibilities.
Simultaneously, those government officials also wear regulatory hats and
have regulatory objectives to pursue. It is unrealistic to expect that a single
person or agency can be so compartmentalized in thinking and behavior
that only one hat can be worn at a time, or that government officials would
relinquish strategic and tactical advantages that come from being able to
switch hats, in the absence of self-imposed restrictions.
Further, in the recent financial crisis, government actors seemed more
willing to use commercial lending relationships in support of overtly
regulatory or political goals, or to engage in what aptly has been described
as “regulation by deal.”10 This practice has led to the perception among
some investors that the government has created a backdoor through which
opportunistic government actors can accomplish regulatory aims yet bypass
normal rules of distribution and regulatory checks and balances. It is costly
and economically distortive for existing stakeholders and potential private
investors to try to quantify the risk that the government’s non-economic
agenda will impair their investments. Perversely, the very goal of
encouraging private capital ahead of the taxpayer is undermined by
inconsistent government conduct and uncertainty over the terms and
conditions of government lending. Ideally for investors, public policy
considerations (and the uncertainties they create) would be expressed
through the political and administrative processes, including the decision to
make the rescue loan, and not by managing the restructuring process
through the loan.
There has been extensive debate over whether and when the
government should invest in a distressed enterprise, at what threshold and
amount, and towards which purpose. In general, there has been thoughtful
consideration about rules to constrain the government’s decision to invest,
rules that lower the incidence of intervention, and rules that increase the
likelihood of successful intervention as seen from the perspective of the
10. See Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009) (discussing the roles
of government as “Deal Facilitator,” “Dealmaker,” and “Deal Machine”). From the
government’s viewpoint, it may be rational or necessary to force existing stakeholders to
bear the costs of providing a public good. This can be done directly by conditioning support
on a particular distribution of estate value, or indirectly through sale of estate assets for less
than reasonably equivalent value or forced assumption of estate liabilities. In addition, the
government sometimes relinquishes recovery, forgoes return, or transfers value to nongovernmental entities. In a free-market economy the government is not supposed to
intervene in a commercial capacity for the purpose of aggregated wealth, but deliberately
acting against its own narrow pecuniary interest is something no purely commercial actor
would do.
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national interest. Less consideration has been paid to how specifically the
government should set contractual terms and conditions of rescue loans,
how it should manage investments once made, and how it should address
conflicts of interest and matters of corporate governance. This article
discusses the historical context of and concerns about government rescue
financing, and then discusses four self-imposed limits on the government’s
ability to condition and manage rescue loans. Compliance with these limits
is justified even though private lending might not be similarly restricted, is
likely to improve predictability of process and outcome, and is not unduly
restrictive of government exercise of discretion.
I.

GOVERNMENT USE OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIPS TO ADVANCE POLICY OR POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES

The federal government has often acted as a commercial lender or
rescue financier in support of markets. Controversy over the scope and
propriety of market intervention started at least as early as the dispute over
the First Bank congressional charter drafted in 1791 (and abandoned in
1811). The Federal Reserve was created in 1913. The War Finance
Corporation, created in 1918, provided loans to support transition to a
peacetime economy after World War I. The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, created in 1932, made loans to and equity injections in
distressed banks, as well as railroads and mortgage associations. The
Federal Home Loan Bank has been in business since 1932. The FDIC has
served a bank depositor backstop function since 1933. Fannie Mae was
created in 1938 to offer federal funds in support of the residential mortgage
market, and was followed by the Government National Mortgage
Association in 1968 and Freddie Mac in 1970. The Student Loan
Marketing Association purchased its first student loan in 1975. The
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation issued its first pension check in
1975.
Post-New Deal bail-outs of private actors ramped up in the 1970s.
Government-funded Amtrak took over intercity rail passenger service from
private operators in 1971,11 and Conrail was created in 1974 to take over
11. Amtrak’s genesis can be traced to the failure of The Penn Central Transportation
Company in 1970. Penn Central filed for bankruptcy after Congress refused to provide
financial assistance to the railroad to meet short-term commercial paper obligations. It was
the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history at the time of its filing, and was not
unambiguously surpassed in size (measured by inflation-adjusted assets) by a corporate filer
until Texaco filed for bankruptcy in 1987. For a discussion of the circumstances
surrounding the Penn Central bankruptcy and its effects on commercial paper markets see
generally Charles Calomiris, Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn-Central
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the lines of multiple bankrupt freight carriers. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation was bailed out through the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of
1971.12 Chrysler Corporation did not file for bankruptcy in 1980 but
instead received controversial federal loan guarantees explicitly
conditioned upon significant concessions from creditors.13 On the financial
institution side, in 1974 Franklin National Bank received an unprecedented
bail-out loan from the Federal Reserve in order to prevent systemic
economic damage predicted to occur in a disorderly wind-down.14
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company failed in 1984 and
remained the biggest bank failure in U.S. history until Washington Mutual
failed in 2008. (In fact, the bail-out and resolution of Continental Illinois
gave rise to the term “too big to fail.”)15 The savings and loan crisis that
Perspective, (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4573, 1993) (arguing
that the principal purpose of the discount window should be to provide temporary support to
certain financial markets during localized financial crises) and STAFF OF THE SEC TO THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY (Comm. Print 1972), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/house/
1972house_fincolpenncentral.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WRP9-UFGP]
(suggesting
recommendations for the SEC to avoid financial crises brought on by large bankruptcy
filings).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1841 (1971) (establishing an Emergency Loan Guarantee Board).
The Act is titled as if it is a broad lending program but ended up a bespoke rescue package
for Lockheed, which borrowed $245 million out of the $250 million facility. See ELMER B.
STAATS, COMP. GEN., PSAD-78-66; B-169300, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY LOAN
GUARANTEE ACT (1978), http://gao.gov/assets/130/121251.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL8AMQ8E] (describing Lockheed Martin as the only business to apply for a guaranteed loan
under the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971).
13. See Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93
Stat. 1324 (1980) (detailing the federal loan guarantees the Chrysler Corporation received in
1980); see also JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40005, CHRYSLER
CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS, AND COST
(2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/569/ [https://perma.cc/K69SU6NA] (providing information on the federal loan guarantees and creditor concessions).
14. See generally JOAN E. SPERO, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK:
CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM (1980) (describing the perceived risks
of failure of the Franklin National Bank); see also Press Release, Federal Reserve (Oct. 8,
1974),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/burns/burns_19741008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/344L-FDZU] (relating how the bail-out of Franklin National Bank was in
the public interest).
See also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/firstfifty/chapter5.html [https://perma.cc/YM7W-A49Y] (last visited Sept.
28, 2016) for a description of the largest FDIC disbursements through 1983 (noting open
bank assistance related to Commonwealth Bank of Detroit in 1972 and First Pennsylvania
Bank in 1980; each bank was a relatively small institution on a national scale but had
geographically concentrated operations that merited intervention based on public policy
reasons).
15. See generally Hilary Foulkes, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The
Rescue of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, 1985 ANN. SURVEY OF
AM. L. 137, 152 (1985) (describing the panic fears that prompted the U.S. to bail out banks
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began in the mid-1980’s culminated with the failure and resolution of over
1,000 financial institutions.16
This context and history is important because investors who claim that
the actions of the federal government in the recent financial crisis are
wholly without precedent overstate their case. Plainly, government actors
looked to historical precedent for guidance and generally attempted to
check legal boxes when formulating their responses to the crisis. To deny
at least some grounding in precedent opens the door to a government retort
that complainants are either disingenuous or lack generational experience.
Instead, the more legitimate critique is that the financial crisis marked a
watershed because of changes in the characteristics of bailed-out
companies and of government exercise of discretion. Investments in highly
regulated or systemically important companies are suddenly and
unexpectedly subject to unprecedented political risk.
A. Recent bail-outs were of unprecedented size, scale and scope,
leaving no private market alternative to government financing
The sheer size of U.S. government commercial intervention during the
recent crisis is staggering. JPMorgan Chase received a $30 billion credit
line in support of its takeover of Bear Stearns. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac cumulatively benefitted from extension of credit lines in excess of
$450 billion. American International Group (“AIG”) was bailed out twice
by the Federal Reserve, to the collective tune of over $120 billion (against
a $180 billion credit line). $700 billion was available to be doled out under
that were too large to fail); see also Renee Haltom, Failure of Continental Illinois, FED. RES.
(May
1984),
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/47
HIST.
[https://perma.cc/XTY5-59HJ]; Larry D. Wall, Ending Too Big to Fail; see also Lessons
from Continental Illinois, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Apr. 2016),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1604
[https://perma.cc/Y989-4WXZ] (exploring the possible effect the Dodd-Frank Act would
have had on banks that are too big to fail). Legislative reaction to the bail-out of
Continental Illinois and non-impairment of general creditors illustrates just how much
history rhymes. Congress attempted to limit rescues of “too big to fail” banks by passing
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Public Law 102-242
(“FDICIA”). The law limited FDIC discretion to protect bank creditors and limited the
Federal Reserve’s ability to lend to troubled banks. Compare this legislative reaction to
Title II of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12
U.S.C. § 5381-5394 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”), which similarly seeks to restrict government
capacity to act in reaction to perceived government overreach in the recent financial crisis.
16. See FDIC DIV. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE, CHAPTER 4, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
BANKING
(1997),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JY9-6Y7Q] (providing an overview of this crisis and the resulting
resolution).
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the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). That amount does not
include the additional $25 billion in pre-TARP low-interest loans made to
companies in the auto industry in 2008 under the Automotive Industry
Financing Program. At peak, there was $1.7 trillion outstanding under the
Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities, in addition to TARP, FDIC and
Federal Reserve support programs. Across just TARP, FDIC and Federal
Reserve support programs, Citigroup and Bank of America received federal
bail-out support of $476 billion and $336 billion, respectively.17
Contrast the size of these financial crisis bail-outs to earlier
interventions. In 1970, when Penn Central defaulted on approximately
$100 million in money market obligations, the Federal Reserve provided
emergency reserves to commercial banks to meet redemptions. In 2008
inflation-adjusted dollars the amount of injected capital was $3.2 billion,
and the congressionally rejected bail-out of Penn Central itself would have
cost less than $2 billion. Lockheed received $1.4 billion in 2008 inflationadjusted dollars. The high-profile bail-out of Chrysler in 1980 was
accomplished with $4 billion in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars.18
The only comparable commercial interventions in recent times related
to the Continental Illinois bank failure and cumulative bail-outs or
liquidations during the savings and loan crisis. Continental Illinois
benefitted from a $5.5 billion private standby credit line offered by a 24bank consortium and a $500 million private subordinated rescue loan
underwritten by seven banks, yet still had to borrow $3.55 billion from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and $1.5 billion more from the FDIC.19
17. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 112ND CONG., THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL (2011) (evaluating the impact of TARP and reviewing
other
government
efforts
in
response
to
the
financial
crisis),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-112shrg64832.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SBA9-39HP]; FINANCIAL TURMOIL TIMELINE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/global_economy/
Crisis_Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQ4-U23M] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016)
(documenting the amounts and timing of federal funding during the recent financial crisis).
18. There is a scene in the comedy spoof movie Austin Powers: International Man of
Mystery, in which a malevolent yet bumbling villain named “Dr. Evil” evaluates blackmail
schemes. Dr. Evil, after having been frozen for 30 years, sinisterly declares he will demand
a ransom of “one million dollars.” His henchmen politely point out that things have
changed since the 1960’s and that “a million dollars isn’t exactly a lot of money these days.”
In retrospect, corporate bail-outs during the 1970’s and 1980’s can be viewed a lot like that
scene – bail-outs were controversial and outsized at the time but are laughably small and
isolated compared to bail-outs starting in 2008, even adjusted for inflation, wealth, and
efficiencies in capital markets. AUSTIN POWERS: INTERNATIONAL MAN OF MYSTERY (1997).
19. See Haltom, supra note 21, (providing a history of the credit line offered to
Continental Illinois); see also FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE, PART II, CH. 4, www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history2-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKK6-2W27] (giving a broader overview of crisis management). The
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Very controversially, the FDIC also lifted the $100,000 per account limit
on deposit insurance and offered credit support to other general creditors,
and as part of its permanent assistance package the FDIC committed to
purchasing up to $4.5 billion in bad loans. In the end, though, the
government bail-out package ended up costing the FDIC less than $2.7
billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. The S&L crisis also could be
described as comparable in size, cumulatively costing taxpayers around
$200 billion in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars. In the S&L crisis, however,
funds were applied over a decade and related to multiple financial
institutions which were resolved using well-established rules and
procedures.
B. Investors do not expect that objections to government rescue
financing terms and conditions will be successful
Investor expectations about resolution processes and opportunities for
negotiation materially differ between private and public rescue loans. In
the private loan context, corporate resolution law and practice is designed
to allow time for the debtor to evaluate alternatives and permit stakeholders
to object to financing beyond the minimum necessary to stabilize the
distressed patient or which is offered for an improper purpose. DIP loans
typically are approved on an interim basis, in amounts less than finally
requested, with periods of review and opportunities to object before final
approval. Ideally, acceptance of proffered financing does not prejudice the
debtor’s ability to seek or take replacement financing. Absent contractual
restrictions (such as a “silent” lender’s inter-creditor agreement),
stakeholders are free to highlight structural impediments to competition
such as an objecting secured lender, or the lack of exigent circumstances,
or the need for more time to raise funds, all in support of objection.
Management may be indicted as biased or controlled, or simply as having
endorsed a deficient solicitation process. And, although it is rare for a DIP
loan to be rejected as an impermissible sub rosa plan of reorganization,
judges are highly resistant to outcome-determinative DIP terms and often
will seek to edit objectionable terms through suasion and foreshadowing.
Investor expectations are completely different when government is
providing rescue financing. The major distinction is that the government
conduct may be unreviewable or not remediable by explicit statute or on
account of sovereign immunity.20 Even assuming judicial review and relief
amounts are quoted in 1984-dollars. The supposition that disorderly liquidation of
Continental Illinois risked a systemic crisis is, at a minimum, reasonable.
20. Courts routinely are divested of authority to restrain or affect actions taken by
agencies pursuant to statute. See, e.g., The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
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is available, however, investor perception is that it is highly unlikely courts
will reject or modify proposed emergency financing coupled with a
credible government claim that disapproval will lead to cascading industry
distress, widespread loss of jobs, material economic disruption, or any
similar national policy problem. Basically, there is little or no prospect that
government DIP terms and conditions will change as a consequence of
objection.
It would take a particularly stout judge to reject government financing
even if objectors could show a high but less-than-certain probability that a
successful going-concern restructuring or orderly liquidation of the
enterprise could be accomplished without accepting funds. Companies that
warrant government bail-outs are not likely to be allowed to liquidate in a
disorderly manner. Government statements about exigent circumstances
and intimated soundness of deliberations underlying the decision to
intervene generally are not ex ante disprovable. Judges will find it difficult
to credibly threaten to reject financing in order to adjust terms so long as
the government loan looks like a private loan and does not trip any specific
codified or common law trap.
Categorization of court objections illustrates why investors perceive
that government DIP terms and conditions cannot be effectively opposed.
The most basic investor objections alleging deal overreach are that postpetition enterprises are not being run for the benefit of those who hold
claims or interests, and that distributions are compelled to be made in
violation of absolute priorities because the government is using DIP
(“EESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a) (2008) (referencing TARP); see also Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5382 (referencing judicial review of Orderly Liquidation); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)
(referencing the anti-injunction provision in the FDIA); see also 12 U.S.C § 4617(f)
(referencing the anti-injunction provision in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
(“HERA”)). Indeed, the draft bail-out proposal that became EESA originally contained
language that would have eliminated judicial review of agency actions altogether, although
blanket immunity never made it into the final legislation. See Text Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/
21draftcnd.html?ref=business [https://perma.cc/M5P4-2WGC] (stating that “[d]ecisions by
the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to
agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative
agency”). Also, stakeholders routinely are divested of derivative rights that otherwise could
be the basis for standing to sue or to affect corporate governance. See, e.g., FDIA, 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) (providing that a conservator and receiver succeed to all “rights, titles,
powers and privileges of the failed institution and its directors, officers, and stockholders”);
see also Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1) (explaining that the receiver shall succeed to
“all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the covered financial company and its assets, and
of any stockholder, member, officer, or director of such company”). Often, judicial review
of agency conduct is limited to determination of whether the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. Ch. 7, has been violated, or if there has been a Constitutional taking. See infra
note 34.
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conditions or contractual consultative rights (read: veto) to further a public
purpose.21 Legally, these objections go absolutely nowhere because a court
inquiry about commercial conduct begins and ends with whether the
acceptance of terms was obtained by impermissible coercion. A private
DIP lender cannot be accused of coercion based on non-existent legislative,
executive or administrative authority. Similarly, a government lender that
claims to wear only a commercial hat and expressly disclaims a regulatory
role – “hey, that’s the other guy” – lacks authority and cannot be engaging
in regulatory coercion.22
Commercial objections to government rescue financing and behavior
tend to come in three flavors: (i) payment terms; (ii) stakeholder
distribution; and (iii) lack of legal authority. All are permutations of
objections to “regulation by deal.”23 Payment term objections include
21. Government actors might credibly argue that they were required in the financial
crisis to act commercially precisely because regulatory options were constrained. That
argument is in the nature of a justification or an expression of well-intentioned opportunistic
behavior. Government actors might also argue that the financial crisis was extraordinary
and not precedential except in the case of a comparable systemic crisis. That argument will
fall on deaf ears, unless regulatory options become more available and more attractive in the
future. Coercive terms and opportunistic use of rescue loans will be assumed to be part of
the playbook, unless restricted by statute, rule or regulation, or until there is evidence of
another shift in culture.
22. In fact, there can be severe actual or perceived conflicts of interest between public
actors and stakeholders over disposition of assets, assumption of liabilities, and corporate
governance. For example, breaking contracts with counterparties may be genuinely
accretive to the bankrupt estate but may be opposed by government actors because of
cascading collateral damage to other companies. Similarly, a sale of company assets, the
outsourcing of jobs, or other massive operational changes may increase recovery but not be
seen as good for the nation. Actions that heighten market disruption might very well
improve the chances of a successful going-concern restructuring, maximize distributable
value, and/or be in the individual or collective interest of affected stakeholders. In a
nutshell, the government may see stabilization and subsidization where a stakeholder sees
wasting of assets and improper assumption of liabilities. To date, however, courts have
reviewed the terms and conditions of government loans solely by examining commercial
conduct and using a commercial coercion standard.
23. Much has been written about the increasingly active participation of government in
corporate restructurings, evolving regulatory and economic roles, and investor perceptions
of deal overreach. See, e.g., Steven D. Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie,
Freddie and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015) (discussing how
regulation by deal circumvented established regulatory precedents through forced
investments and transactions); see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy
Reorganization after Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305
(2010) (explaining ways in which courts may disadvantageously extend regulatory
precedents set by the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies); see also Steven M.
Davidoff & David Zaring, supra note 16, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (itemizing
transactions encouraged or taken by the government in the recent financial crisis). It is
beyond the scope of this article to recount the circumstances of each controversial bail-out
or to opine on the fairness of any particular transaction or government action. With that
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complaints that cost of funding is too high for the risk, deliberately
confiscatory or punitive, or that the debtor recipient is not easily permitted
to replace funding should better terms be available in the future.24
Stakeholder distribution objections can arise because of explicit terms and
conditions of rescue financing, or as a consequence of post-petition
government interference in corporate governance. Distribution objections
most directly include challenges to payment of plan value in conflict with
corporate and capital structure priorities or government earmarking of
consideration to a junior class not in accord with absolute priority. They
also indirectly include arguments that distributable value is reduced
because of sale of assets for less than full value or imprudent assumption of
liabilities.
On paper, it appears that courts will entertain claims of deficient
process and commercial overreach by assuming government actors can
exercise the same rights and control as private actors. As it is common for
courts to acquiesce to burdensome private loans in the absence of
alternative financing, government payment and distribution terms
inevitably are accepted, aside from tinkering with deadlines and notice
provisions. Despite some high-profile disputes over valuation of collateral
said, it is a useful construct also to categorize government interventions based on the type of
government support and the nature of potential investor objections. “Open” transactions in
the absence of formal restructuring, where the government arranges acquisitions of private
parties or provides capital support to private parties in support of acquisitions (e.g.,
Wachovia Corp., Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Long-Term Capital Management), present
issues of voluntariness, valuation, and unfair discrimination among stakeholders. Prerestructuring capital injections (e.g., TARP) raise the same issues, along with concerns over
pricing and repayment terms and explicit or implicit regulatory interference in corporate
governance. FDIC intervention (e.g., Washington Mutual Bank) comes with the risk that
the agency will sell assets for less than reasonably equivalent value or wind-down the
enterprise in a way that unduly prioritizes banking stability over financial creditor recovery.
DIP or post-petition acquisition loans (e.g., Chrysler Group LLC, General Motors Co.,
Delphi Corp.) squarely pose questions about voluntariness, valuation and corporate
governance, and whether loans can be conditioned to effect unfair discrimination or
earmarks. Finally, the eight-years-and-counting professed conservatorships of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac raise issues of government conflict of interest and self-dealing in
amending the terms and conditions of rescue financing, regulatory interference in corporate
governance, and strategic avoidance of judicial review.
24. For example, testimony of government officials confirms that rescue financing
packages provided to each of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac deliberately were priced to
be punitive and confiscatory. For a summary of testimony about the allegedly punitive
terms, see Plaintiffs’ Corrected Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact, Starr Int’l Co. v.
United States (Mar. 2, 2015), Case 1:11-cv-00779, Document 430 at 225-229. Testimony
from former U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner about the financial terms exacted is clear:
“[W]e forced losses on shareholders proportionate to the mistakes of the firm. And we
made it clear in the GSEs and AIG that they would be dismembered, not allowed to live on
as independent entities with the scope and reach they had before the crisis.” Id. at 226.
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or gifting of value, stakeholders have not had meaningful success in
adjusting explicit contractual terms that mandate sale of assets, assumption
of liabilities, or a particular distribution of value.25 Beyond clearing a “best
interests” hurdle and preserving liens on proceeds of asset sales,26 there is
little expectation among investors that a bankruptcy court would
disapprove explicit outcome-determinative financing conditions in a
government rescue loan.
In contrast, the third type of challenge – allegations that executive and
independent agencies exceeded statutory authority to act – has been more
successful. Unfortunately, if it is posited that authority is properly
delegated to an agency and that agency does not act in derogation of a
specific mandate,27 the statutory objection does not actually reach the
25. One example of a successful objection to government-arranged financing relates to
the bankruptcy of Delphi Corporation. In 2009, the debtor, General Motors and the
Treasury’s auto task force arranged funding for a private equity firm to purchase the
debtor’s assets, facilitating an “open” exit-financing transaction. The secured senior
creditors in that case successfully argued that the preferred private equity firm was receiving
a sweetheart deal and that the sale process should be competitive and open. Eventually,
secured creditors were able to credit-bid for the assets. Here, the exception proves the rule.
Although Delphi plainly was distressed when it filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the amount of
needed DIP financing was contextually small (approximately $4 billion) and was privately
raised in relatively healthy credit markets. By 2009, Delphi had survived a four-year
bankruptcy process, implicitly negating claims of exigent circumstances, and cancellation of
indebtedness allowed the raising of sufficient liquidity to maintain operations. Even so,
salaried retirees who were excluded from an implicit government bail-out of other
pensioners brought unsuccessful complaints about discriminatory treatment. In re Delphi
Corp., No. 05-44481(RDD), 2009 WL 2482146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009); see also
The Delphi Pension Bail-out: Unequal Treatment of Retirees, Comm. on Oversight &
Government Reform, 113th Cong. 1 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG113hhrg81743/html/CHRG-113hhrg81743.htm [https://perma.cc/WW2S-GRWV] (hearing
whether certain classes of holders of claims or interests had been discriminated against
during bail-out proceedings.)
26. The only practical obstacles to bankruptcy court approval are that plan distributions
must be at least equal to the amount that the objecting stakeholder would have received in a
hypothetical liquidation, as estimated by the court, and that secured lenders are not
involuntarily divested of property rights without compensation in the form of continuing
liens and cash payments, liens on sale proceeds, or realization by such holders of the
indubitable equivalent of such claims. Bankr., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2)(A) (2012).
The ability of secured lenders to prevent a below-market sale of assets, to challenge the
court’s estimate of collateral value, or to challenge gifting is at issue in many restructurings,
and was particularly at issue in the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors. See David
A. Skeel Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121 (2015)
(discussing how transactions engineered for Chrysler’s and General Motors’ bankruptcies
affected the outcome of Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy).
27. Under the non-delegation doctrine courts will consider whether there is valid
enabling legislation that offers an “intelligible principle” to limit broad agency authority, a
requirement that has been violated very rarely. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (giving only two examples of when the Court has found that a
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merits of discretionary agency actions. Instead, loan terms and conditions
set by agency discretion will be reviewed under the highly deferential
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.28 In addition, assuming justiciability
and a viable claim for exceeding statutory authority, court review and relief
for investors may be limited by statute, and if available may take too long
to meet some investment horizons or be too expensive to obtain.29 At best,
statute lacks an intelligible principle). There is a stronger argument that the non-delegation
doctrine operates as a canon of statutory construction and to constrain an agency to act in a
manner that compares the costs and benefits of regulation. See generally C. Boyden Gray,
The Nondelegation Canon’s Neglected History and Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 619 (2015) (stating that although the non-delegation doctrine is no longer
used to completely strike down statutes, it may be used as a canon of statutory construction).
It is interesting to consider whether overreaching commercial (and not facially regulatory)
activity could be constrained by the application of the non-delegation doctrine. For
example, could a court find that imposition of punitive terms and conditions, or adjusting
priorities of distribution, are legislative functions and therefore limit agencies to “normal”
commercial lending relationships, to avoid constitutional problems? Cf. Nat’l Cable
Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (limiting the definition of “fees”
that can be collected by the Federal Communications Commission to exclude fees on
account of benefits to the public at large); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d
666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that delegation of legislative function to a private party is per
se unconstitutional), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015)
(holding that Amtrak is a governmental entity). A governmental entity that acts as a market
participant but with a non-commercial purpose has some attributes of a governmental entity
and some attributes of a private party. Regardless, it is hard to imagine any investor relying
on the non-delegation doctrine as a serious control against commercial overreach.
28. The APA confers basic authority for courts to review agency actions in the absence
of legislation specifically divesting that authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that a
“reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415 (1971) (holding that even if agency actions are entitled to a presumption of regularity,
“the generally applicable standards of § 706 require the reviewing court to engage in
substantial inquiry”). However, the standard of review is extremely deferential, requiring
only that the agency articulates a “rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made” and that the court examine “whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (permitting deference to agency interpretation of
its own regulations unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[s]o long as the
agency does not stray beyond the ambiguity in the text being interpreted, deference compels
the reviewing court to ‘decide’ that the text means what the agency says”) (emphasis in
original); cf. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(explaining that when considering an express delegation of authority to an agency,
“legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute”).
29. From an investor’s viewpoint, challenging an agency decision is an uphill battle.
There may be a sufficient and articulated rational basis for an agency decision even if the
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court review is slow and uncertain, and at worst, unavailable or pyrrhic.30
C. Going forward
The legislative response to the financial crisis included significant
restrictions on government bail-outs. Among other things, the FDIC no
longer can use a systemic risk exception to broadly guarantee banks or
bank holding companies not in resolution,31 and section 13(3) loans by the
agency also acted for a transparently improper purpose. Even when an agency decision
plainly is unsupportable, overturning that decision can take money, time, and expertise.
There is a subset of investors who specialize in wagering on legal disputes, either directly
through litigation or derivatively through an affected company. In general, these distressed
or special-situation investors are better equipped and more willing than regular-way
investors to analyze and prosecute lengthy and complicated disputes, and to take affirmative
actions to enhance idiosyncratic return on investment. However, required return on invested
capital for these investors typically is higher than for regular-way investors. Accordingly,
existing investments often reprice lower when a company becomes distressed, whether new
money actually is raised. For a brief discussion about why distressed investment
opportunities exist and the different skill sets of distressed investors, see Stephen G. Moyer
et al., A Primer on Distressed Investing: Buying Companies by Acquiring Their Debt, 24
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 73-75 (2012). Two excellent introductory texts that
explore distressed investing and markets in more detail are STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED
DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE INVESTORS (2005) and STUART C. GILSON,
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES,
BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS (2001).
30. Appeals are still pending, but it is hard to envision a more pyrrhic victory than the
challenge to the bail-out terms for AIG, in which plaintiffs won on the issue of illegal
exaction but received nothing in damages. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl.
428, 436 (2015) (ruling that the Federal Reserve exceeded statutory authority when it
injected capital into AIG but not awarding damages). There also are multiple pending
challenges related to amendments to the terms of the rescue financing facility provided to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Government Takeover
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Upending Capital Markets with Lax Business and
Constitutional Standards, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 379 (2014) (describing the lawsuits
alleging that the government shed its obligation to junior preferred and common
shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); see also Significant Lawsuits Concerning
Fannie Mae & Freddy Mac Net Worth Sweep (2016), http://bankrupt.com/
gselitigationsummary201608.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVX2-5F7M] (listing significant
lawsuits concerning the Net Worth Sweep and highlighting that over three years have
passed since the first lawsuits were filed, with none yet reaching the merits of government
conduct). Courts may also abstain altogether from deciding disputes. The Delaware state
courts abstained from deciding whether the Bear Stearns share exchange agreement was
invalid under Delaware law on what were essentially comity grounds. In re Bear Stearns
Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9,
2008).
31. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5613(a) (2010) (stating that the FDIC “may not
exercise its authority under section 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) of this title to establish any widely
available debt guarantee program for which section 5612 of this title would provide
authority”).
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Federal Reserve cannot be made to insolvent institutions and are limited to
programs of broad-based eligibility.32 Systemically important non-bank
financial institutions are now resolved under the Orderly Liquidation
Authority set forth in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, to avoid another
Lehman-type failure or AIG-type bail-out. Broadly, this legislation and
related regulation seeks to “bail-in” existing creditors by converting debt to
equity (or extinguishing obligations) such that the resolved enterprise is
solvent and has reasonable capital to engage in future business. In theory,
bail-in reduces the chance that the government will be forced to lend to an
insolvent enterprise.
The gating question is whether the untested orderly liquidation path
will be followed at all. There are powerful incentives for regulators to
intervene creatively to avoid receivership, or to find unusual circumstances
that justify exceptions to prescribed procedure. The receivership remedy
embedded in Dodd-Frank is draconian and essentially irreversible, and
unanticipated problems or implementation errors carry severe
consequences. In the end, orderly liquidation may be a nuclear option
rarely used and circumvented in most crises by creative bail-outs or forced
deal-making.33 It may be unpalatable to provide liquidity only to
32. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 343(3)(A), (B)(ii). 
33. The risk that Title II still allows for back-door bail-outs has been highlighted by
government officials. See Charles Plosser, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Address
at the Fourth Annual Simon N.Y.C. Conference Reform at a Crossroads: Economic
Transformation in the Year Ahead (May 9, 2013) (transcript available at
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2013/05-09-13_can-we-endtoo-big-to-fail [https://perma.cc/JM7J-V5F4]) (arguing that “Title II resolution is likely to
be biased toward bail-outs,” because of the “wide range of discretionary powers” granted to
the FDIC and the likely “excessive delay” in implementing the receivership procedure); see
also Jeffrey Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Address at Council on
Foreign Relations: Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/
president_jeff_lacker/2013/lacker_speech_20130509
[https://perma.cc/Y3YL-N2Q4])
(arguing that the FDIC’s considerable regulatory discretion under Title II could encourage
creditors to believe they may continue to receive protection from losses). There may be
more direct ways to avoid or circumvent orderly liquidation, such as subsequent
congressional authority to lend, acquiescence to creative lending by Treasury, or intentional
refusal by government officials to seek appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Specific
restrictions on Federal Reserve lending could be circumvented by ambiguity or delay in
determination of insolvency or by defining a broad-based program in such a way that
eligibility is widespread but application is narrow. Note also that in 2015, the Federal
Reserve approved a final rule specifying procedures for emergency lending under section
13(3). The rule contemplates a penalty interest rate that in theory can be set by auction but
ultimately is left to the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. 12 C.F.R. § 201.51 (2015);
see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 30, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20151130a.htm
[https://perma.cc/6UDC-P4SQ] (providing a description of the final rule). Similarly, with
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companies that are solvent and have sufficient collateral to fully secure the
loan. To the extent the government provides rescue financing outside of
orderly liquidation, investors face risk that the terms and conditions of that
financing will be ad hoc. To the extent investors believe orderly
liquidation is too inflexible to be implemented, the government has not
addressed moral hazard and adverse selection.
The second question is whether there are any effective constraints on
the terms and conditions of liquidity-based government lending under
orderly liquidation (or alternatives such as proposed Chapter 14 to the
Bankruptcy Code).34 Other than a few specific limitations, such as a
prohibition on the FDIC taking an equity interest in a covered financial
company,35 there is little to stop the government from setting onerous terms
and conditions for rescue funding since there is no requirement that lending
terms be tied to risk of repayment. Although the Orderly Liquidation Fund
can borrow funds at a corporate index spread over treasuries,36 there is no
restriction on the terms or conditions of loans made to the covered
company, or more likely, on the terms or conditions for assuming or
guaranteeing the obligations of the covered company.37 There are few
constraints on how the FDIC funds a bridge corporation or purchaser in an
open transaction, leaving stakeholders vulnerable to under-market
disposition of assets or objectionable retention of liabilities.38 To the
contrary, legislation and regulatory guidance is strongly biased in favor of
respect to banks, the FDIC still can invoke a systemic risk exception to provide assistance to
creditors of a bank in resolution. It is not hard to envision a “pre-packaged” resolution
coupled with targeted bridge bank assistance that avoids receivership of a bank holding
company.
34. See generally Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421, 113th
Cong. (2014) (proposing to amend Title 11 of the United States Code to facilitate the
resolution of a “covered financial corporation” in bankruptcy); 160 CONG. REC. H8174-81
(daily ed. Dec. 1, 2014) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte), 160 CONG. REC. 144, at
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/12/01/house-section/article/H8174-4
[https://perma.cc/NFW9-W84L] (describing the rationale and testimony in support of the
House Bill); ANDREW CROCKETT ET AL., BANKRUPTCY NOT BAIL-OUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER
14 (WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC POLICY) (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds.,
Hoover Institution Press) (2012) (containing multiple articles relating to modification of
established bankruptcy process to address government bail-outs and systemic corporate
failures).
35. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5386(6) (2010).
36. Id. at § 5390(n)(5)(C).
37. Id. at § 5384(d). Government support is likely to take the form of assumptions and
guarantees rather than direct loans, other than emergency support to stabilize the covered
company. That is because the maximum obligation limitation set forth in 12 U.S.C. §
5390(m)(6) is less likely to be reached through cumulated expected losses than by dollarfor-dollar funding.
38. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2010). 
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protection of the taxpayer and least cost resolution of the covered
company.39
The third question is whether subsidiaries deliberately not placed in
receivership under the adopted single point of entry (“SPOE”) strategy will
need government funding.40 Simplified, the SPOE strategy envisions that
covered controlled groups will be organized so that all operations are
conducted by subsidiaries under an umbrella financial-holding company.
Each holding company ideally will issue long-term, third-party debt (i.e.,
incur obligations in a broad market where default is presumed not to pose
systemic risk) in an amount greater than expected consolidated losses for
its controlled group. The basic construct of Dodd-Frank is that the FDIC,
as receiver, steps into the shoes of prior management and the board of
directors, and liquidates the covered holding company in an orderly
fashion. Operating subsidiaries are transferred to a bridge holding
company and continue doing business in the ordinary course. In exchange
for the operating subsidiaries’ assets and transfer of other assets, the old
holding company receives equity in the new bridge holding company.
Existing holding company debt and liabilities not assumed by the bridge
39. The FDIC as receiver also will have unprecedented discretion as to how creditors
are treated in resolution, including the ability to treat similarly situated creditors
dissimilarly. See 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4), (d)(4), (h)(5)(E). But see Resolution of
Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed.
Reg. 76614, 76622 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (requesting comments and noting that “[t]he
FDIC has stated that it would not exercise its discretion to treat similarly situated creditors
differently in a manner that would result in preferential treatment to holders of long-term
senior debt (defined as unsecured debt with a term of longer than one year), subordinated
debt, or equity holders”); 12 C.F.R. § 380.27 (indicating treatment of certain similarly
situated claimants should not be preferential). This caveat still leaves the FDIC wide
discretion to favor short-term creditors, operating creditors, many financial counterparties,
and labor. Perhaps the most expansive provision allowing for preferential treatment of
creditors is 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(4)(A)(1)(D)(i), which allows “additional payments or
credit[s] additional amounts to or with respect to or for the account of any claimant or
category of claimants of the covered financial company, if the Corporation determines that
such payments or credits are necessary or appropriate to minimize losses to the Corporation
as receiver from the orderly liquidation of the covered financial company under this
section.” One wonders whether this critical-vendor-on-steroids provision ironically could
be used to prefer systemically important claimants over ordinary counterparties and small
businesses, on the grounds that failure to transfer value would cause cascading disruption.
40. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614, 76622 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (containing the
FDIC’s description of the SPOE strategy), and comments received, available at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/2013-single-point-entry.html
[https://perma.cc/NP4L-JCX8]. The SPOE concept is most often discussed in the context of
Dodd-Frank, but equally could apply to resolution under proposed Chapter 14 of the
Bankruptcy Code, or other resolution regimes.
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holding company are subject to compromise. The operating subsidiaries
and the new bridge holding company are solvent, in theory.
Positing solvency does not mean either the bridge holding company or
operating subsidiaries have sufficient liquidity to support operations. There
is no reason to presume that subsidiary creditors will roll short-term debt,
that counterparties will revert to typical payment terms, or that operating
cash flow will normalize while the holding company is in receivership.41
Indeed, the opposite may be true. As in a bankruptcy, SPOE subsidiaries
suffer funding infirmities such as investor differentiation and discontinuity
of capital, asymmetric information and control, and lack of separation
between subsidiaries and parent. There is also a risk that, prior to
receivership, obligations ordinarily incurred by the parent holding company
were shifted to subsidiaries. Not only is this a moral hazard problem, but it
may mean that subsidiary creditors will be particularly sensitive to any risk
of illiquidity or lack of government support for subsidiaries. And, even if
the SPOE construct makes it more likely that subsidiaries are solvent,
whether the subsidiaries are insolvent or only illiquid may itself depend on
the degree of government support.
Pointedly, the subsidiaries of the covered holding company are not
placed in receivership under SPOE. Those subsidiaries generally are
eligible to borrow as normal companies under existing government lending
programs or undefined future government lending programs. Investors
perceive substantial risk that subsidiaries would be forced to accept or
would acquiesce to noncommercial lending terms and conditions.42 In
addition, to the extent a government agency provides financing, either
directly or through the covered holding company, there is no requirement
that loan terms and conditions differentiate between holding companies and
subsidiaries, or among subsidiaries. How these subsidiary loan facilities
are priced and conditioned, how they are exited, and how corporate
41. See John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 122 (2015) (“A recapitalized SIFI in Title II may, however,
face a liquidity crunch even if it is fundamentally solvent. The short-term creditors of its
operating subsidiaries may (out of an abundance of caution due to the opacity of the SIFI’s
true value) refuse to roll over their loans, and the SIFI may not have enough cash and liquid
securities to pay them all back.”). Creditors and counterparties might be more likely to roll
debt, extend credit, and purchase product if the terms of the government’s liquidity facility
were predictable, transparent, and purely commercial in nature.
42. Under Dodd-Frank, the FDIC has replaced management at the holding company.
There is no guarantee that subsidiaries will have functioning independent management, and
in any event subsidiaries operate under omnipresent threat of receivership and regulatory
action. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5384(c)(3) (2010) (providing for consultation between the receiver and regulators); 12
U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(E) (providing for receivership of failing subsidiaries). Essentially,
there may not be a fiduciary accountable to existing subsidiary stakeholders.
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governance is managed in the interim, all affect the cost of capital at the
operating subsidiaries,43 and particularly at the residual-value holding
company that initially issued bail-in debt.
Prospective investors are very concerned about how the FDIC will
exercise orderly liquidation authority under Title II of The Dodd-Frank
Act, or how a different authority or agency will act. The basic issue is
whether the exercise of agency discretion can be predicted. Superficially, it
is understandable for Congress to delegate resolution authority to agencies
in a manner similar to delegation of bank resolution authority under the
FDIA. However, there is no precedent for how the FDIC will act in its
capacity as Title II resolution authority, nor is there transparent guidance
about how the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, or any other authority will set
terms and conditions of prospective rescue loans in the next crisis.
II.

PRIVATE INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE ON
PREDICTABILITY AND CERTAINTY OF PROCESS

Investors are path-dependent, and they allocate capital based on past
practice, formal rules, and informal rules and standards.44 Ad hoc or post
hoc alteration of rights and expectations is incredibly damaging to investor
confidence – there is little objective about green meaning “go” and red
meaning “stop” but the rule would never be switched while driving.
Indeed, within reason, investors who do not know in what part of the
capital structure the next investment will be made should prefer
predictability of process over substantive outcome, to reduce dead-weight
loss. Predictability is so valuable that sometimes an investment will trade
up, not down, on news of a larger-than-expected penalty or fine because the
gain in certainty is worth more than the extra realized loss.
A substantively poor rule may result in risk allocations and costs of
capital that are suboptimal for individual companies or national interests.
43. Since the SPOE strategy presumes solvency at the subsidiary level, government
lending to the controlled subsidiary group should be viewed as providing liquidity and not
addressing balance-sheet insolvency. Accordingly, there is a strong intellectual argument
that a secured subsidiary liquidity facility should be relatively low-cost and transparent, with
a predictable moral hazard premium and otherwise plain-vanilla terms, analogous to practice
at the Federal Reserve Discount Window.
44. Not all ambiguities need be resolved for informal practices and procedures to
provide a measure of predictability for investors. For example, the term “indubitable
equivalent” has been tossed around in bankruptcy case law since 1935 and is expressly
incorporated in Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the term has meaning only
as applied, general agreement among practitioners about what the term should mean reduces
uncertainty of outcome to marginal disputes.
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The individual investor, however, will adjust the price paid for an
investment until required return on invested capital is met, within reason.
For example, an investor may lend money in the U.S. and in France to
materially similar companies but at dissimilar rates that reflect differing
priority of labor claims in bankruptcy. Similarly, state law contractual
priorities of distribution can be changed or even reversed through
application of the Bankruptcy Code (e.g., elevation of unsecured claims
into administrative claims, disallowance or limitation of otherwise
enforceable claims, conversion of non-recourse claims into recourse,
nonconsensual priming liens, etc.), but these exceptions are explicit,
predictable, and can be priced. The baseline expectation of investors is that
net asset value will be distributed or deemed distributed in order of noninsolvency capital priority. The government is free to make exceptions to
this rule of general application, but such exceptions need to be predictable
and applied consistently to be accepted by investors.
A. Government signaling during the recent financial crisis indicates
greater willingness to impair private capital, and less willingness
to distinguish illiquidity from balance-sheet insolvency
For heavily regulated industries the political pendulum seems to be
swinging more towards heightened regulation and protecting the taxpayer,
and against private investor recovery. Investors are concerned that the
government deliberately will “bail-in” more of a capital structure than
necessary for rehabilitation, both to show that private capital shares the risk
of business failure and to avoid perception of a windfall arising from
government intervention.
Many would argue there should be no
complaining by stakeholders unless and until recovery is lower than if the
government had not provided aid. The unstated (and sometimes stated)
justification is that existing stakeholders have diminished entitlement to
value created by explicit and implicit government support and bail-out.
The corollary view is that because the government created value in excess
of theoretical recoveries in a disorderly liquidation it may place any
conditions upon distribution of that excess value.
Re-characterizing “but for” recovery as a windfall that can be reallocated by the government is an especially pernicious position to take
because it is logically wrong and because it proves too much. “But for”
deposit insurance, many banks would be insolvent. Many highly regulated
companies such as insurance companies and utilities could not survive “but
for” regulatory tolerance and market protection. Patent-holders would not
have value “but for” government enforcement of intellectual property
rights. At the most basic level, “but for” pre-petition private capital, there
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would not be an enterprise to bail out.45
No reasonable restructuring practitioner would expect to win an
argument that a private rescue lender equitably is entitled to all excess
value simply because that excess value would not exist “but for” the rescue
financing. There is no absolute or controlling principle for determining
how distributions in excess of disorderly liquidation should be shared
between rescue financiers and existing stakeholders, and the value of a loan
typically is viewed from the perspective of the debtor’s estate, not that of
the lender. Basically, injection of public capital by a reluctant lender of last
resort is an extraordinary political event but is not a special case.
Private capital investors in rescued businesses never have enjoyed
public sympathy. Even so, investor perception is that during the recent
financial crisis government rescues were deliberately structured to
designate “winners” and “losers” in a way not pervasive in the 1970s and
80s. To some, the government purposefully adjusted private capital
recoveries or interfered in corporate governance to favor particular parties
at the expense of others.46 More generally, government action in the 2008
45. Putting aside that there is no objective way to allocate value among multiple “but
for” creators of value, it can be recognized that the government has the power to create
value, or through inaction to destroy value, without inferring a corresponding right to
condition distribution of that value. There are many examples where government action
need not be taken, but, if taken, cannot be conditioned in an unfettered manner. Few would
support the proposition that just because the government acts as an employer it may
condition employment on waiver of First Amendment rights. See Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (stating that “[t]he theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected”). Similarly, although
conditions placed on discretionary federal spending power are rarely invalidated,
appropriations also are subject to “unconstitutional conditions” analysis. In many ways,
analysis of “regulation by deal” is just a lower-stakes (i.e., not constitutional, but policy)
version of well-recognized unconstitutional conditions analysis. See Richard Epstein,
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 7 (1988) (noting that “[t]he problem of unconstitutional conditions arises
whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted”) (emphasis in original). 
46. It is important to distinguish between intent to advance a policy or political goal by
redistributing value in favor of a favored creditor class and intent to impair recoveries of
disfavored creditors for a political purpose. New York and Washington, D.C. may be on the
same coast but often speak a different language, and government actors need to be careful
not to create unintended perception that harm to any good-faith investor is purposeful and
not incidental. Very little scares away capital faster than undermining foundational
principles of state corporations law and markets that similarly-situated investors are entitled
to equal treatment and application of the rule of law. Nor should offsetting biases be
confused with the absence of biases. It is cold comfort to an injured investor that some
other investor is reaping corresponding rewards. In addition to attempting to improve
substantive outcomes, the prescriptions in Section IV, infra, are intended to lessen the
appearance of bias and impropriety.
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crisis tended to be ad hoc and results-oriented, and did not always conform
to investors’ baseline expectation that rules of general application should
dictate which parties prevail and which lose.
Moreover, the government’s understandable aversion to bail-out of
private investors appears to have metastasized into a rejection of positive
aspects of its role as liquidity provider of last resort. The government is not
signaling how it intends to differentiate terms and conditions of loans made
on account of illiquidity and loans made on account of balance-sheet
insolvency. Instead, the government is signaling that the failure of a toobig-to-fail corporate group is unacceptable. Consider two companies in the
abstract. The first is wildly solvent, with the value of illiquid assets greatly
exceeding near-term liabilities. The second is wildly insolvent, with longterm liabilities greatly exceeding asset value. Both companies may fail,
and each may need to borrow the same amount in order to restructure. The
underlying cause of failure of the first company is duration mismatch of
assets and liabilities, and capital structure will be maintained through the
restructuring in the ordinary course. The underlying failure of the second
company is balance-sheet insolvency and/or under-capitalization. Not only
will residual stakeholders expect to be impaired in the restructuring, but the
cost of rescue financing is likely to be much greater than for the first
company.
When the government acts as a lender of last resort, it, too, needs to
distinguish between liquidity and balance-sheet solvency in order to
support markets and investor expectations. The goal should be to make
government financing distasteful enough to send a message to potential
borrowers that such lending should be regarded only as a last resort,47 but
not so oppressive that private markets shy away from providing capital
based on risks of value destruction or being primed as a result of
government intervention. This balancing act requires price differentiation
based on the risk of default and recovery, ranging from a plainly covered
liquidity facility to a loan made to a net asset insolvent entity highly
unlikely to repay.
When the government fails to give guidance about how it intends to
differentiate terms and conditions of rescue loans – and particularly when it
fails to make assurances that state corporation law priorities of distribution
and security interests will be respected – investors are left with few options
other than to overlay a costly sovereign risk component to corporate
47. To avoid moral hazard, there is a well-understood and accepted policy that terms of
government rescue loans should be less advantageous than private capital. See WALTER
BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 197 (London: Henry
S. King & Co. 1873) (articulating that lender-of-last-resort “loans should only be made at a
very high rate of interest,” commonly referred to as a penalty rate). 

2016]

GOVERNMENT AS RESCUE FINANCIER

77

recovery analysis. This assessment of sovereign risk premium increases
borrowing expenses for all systemically important or highly regulated
companies, and materially increases borrowing expenses for stressed
companies most in need of financing. Without predictable rules, standards,
and practices to restrict government actors, capital is more expensive, and
at some point prohibitively so.48
B. Uncertainty also limits government flexibility to act
The most obvious cost of ambiguity is increased risk that the to-berescued entity will fail and need to be bailed out. Lack of predictable terms
and conditions of post-failure government intervention, coupled with
opacity of agency processes, discourages formation of private capital. By
increasing the risk to private investors who inject pre-failure capital, the
government actually decreases the probability that much smaller amounts
of private capital, timely injected, would have prevented failure in the first
place.
There can be a massive multiplier effect when a distressed but not-yetfailed company receives an infusion of liquidity or capital. Consider a
bank in the throes of a bank run, the archetypal emergency borrower.
Relatively small (as measured against the bank’s actual and contingent
liabilities) injections of liquidity may kick the can until the risk of failure
abates. Relatively small injections of capital, whether by new money or
conversion of debt-like instruments into equity, might entice the bank’s
counterparties to reevaluate credit risk. Similarly, in the corporate arena,
liquidity can allow a balance-sheet insolvent company to survive an
exogenous shock, and at least postpone failure. Even for an insolvent
company, small improvements in ability to pay and modest indications of
market confidence, as a consequence of new capital, can start a virtuous
cycle of working capital normalization and business stability. Uncertainty
about the cost of government lending and treatment of existing private
48. The other distortive effect of failure to differentiate is that at-risk enterprises will
hold more liquidity than may be optimal. For example, a small company that can access
bankruptcy and private capital markets optimally might hold enough liquidity to avoid
restructuring with 95% confidence. The consequence of being wrong is a predictable
restructuring that respects corporate structure and capital structure priorities. On the other
hand, the systemically important institution that cannot access private markets faces a binary
choice: avoid restructuring entirely or risk an unpredictable process with respect to both
value and distribution of value. Fear of the unknown may cause that institution to hold
enough liquidity to avoid restructuring with 99%+ confidence. Reducing the incidence of
business failure by deliberately forcing companies to raise and hold perfect-storm liquidity
comes at a steep cost, especially if creditors cannot rely solely on credit-risk analysis to
determine out how much more to charge for junior debt than senior debt.

78

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19:1

capital makes it more difficult to attract new private capital to prevent
failure, potentially in lieu of post-failure government funding.
The other problem is that ad hoc policies make it very difficult for the
government to provide clear signals to investors, and the need to clarify or
change signals may actually constrain behavior. In the most extreme case,
ad hoc policies may force the government to change its conduct precisely
in order to signal that prior government action will not be repeated (e.g.,
refusing to stretch legal authority to bail-out Lehman Brothers in part to
show the government would allow a broker-dealer to fail, in light of opentransaction assistance to save Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch).
Government officials might prefer to rely on informal guidance, but such
guidance typically is not legally binding, not all investors will accept
informal guidance as credible, facts and circumstances may change, and
intent may change. Some investors will make unfavorable assumptions
based on asymmetric information and the risk that government does not
follow prior guidance. Other investors will assume the government
affirmatively will seek to punish disfavored private investors or companies.
To some, government decisions made post-investment inevitably will
appear driven by opaque policy concerns or politics in the absence of preexisting procedures. Private capital from these skeptical investors may be
either unavailable or materially more expensive than expected by the
government. Like the used car market, where asymmetry of information
can mean both the buyer and seller are worse off,49 the government loses
flexibility to communicate differing intention to make a favorable, market,
or above-market loan.
At first glance, strategic ambiguity appears to be a one-way option in
favor of the government because the government controls outcome.
However, solutions that appear to limit optionality might in fact improve
policy flexibility and improve markets. It is not clear that there is a net
benefit attributable to deliberate uncertainty about terms and conditions of
rescue financing, or about how a loan recipient will be managed, given the
many other levers the government can use to limit moral hazard and
49. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 3 Q. J. ECON. 84, 488-500 (1970) (showing that both the buyer
and seller can be better off when information is shared). The government as rescue
financier has better information than the market about what it intends to do, and further has
the ability to change intention or behavior in secret. This asymmetry can create problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard. Even if guidance by government officials is
straightforward, some investors will still assume that they are being sold a lemon and will
price capital accordingly. Other investors will assume the government will always bail-out
their investments and will engage in risk-seeking behavior. Market outcome can be
improved if signaling of private government information is credible and likely to be
followed, including setting predictable bounds on agency behavior. 
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adverse selection.
III.

THE GOVERNMENT IS DIFFERENT THAN A PRIVATE
LENDER AND SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO ACT WITH
ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN AN UNCOMPETITIVE MARKET

The government justifies its commercial behavior, in part, by arguing
that it is just like any other commercial lender, entitled to set terms and
conditions of rescue loans in accordance with negotiating leverage. In
essence, the government asks “if a hedge fund can lend on coercive terms
why can’t we do the same?” Suppose instead that the question is flipped
around, and investors ask “would a hedge fund subject to the same legal
infirmities as a government actor and acting with ulterior motives be able
to lend on the same coercive terms?” It is not entirely clear that a court
would, or should, approve that hypothetical private lender’s terms. Both
ordinary restructuring rules and state corporations law might lead to
disapproval, based on the status of the lender and/or ulterior motive.50
A. Restructuring rules
The Bankruptcy Code, together with developed common law and
practices, restricts many actions based on proposed conduct or identity
50. “Ulterior motive” sounds nefarious. The description almost always is intended as a
pejorative. But, in the context of evaluating the actions of an actual or proposed DIP lender,
ulterior need not mean improper or even unobvious. Any unstated motive other than
protecting against capital loss or increasing return on the narrow rescue financing should be
viewed normatively as ulterior. A private lender that injects capital to preserve a different
investment, or to gain ownership or control of a business, or to block investment by another,
may be acting with an ulterior motive that is both perfectly clear and ultimately judged
permissible. Beyond being permissible, some rescue financings are public policy subsidies
and welcomed by stakeholders. If stakeholder distributions patently do not fall as a
consequence of aid, or even better, if the rescue financing is priced and conditioned to
enhance stakeholder recovery, an aid package should be unobjectionable to stakeholders. In
such circumstances, competitors, rather than stakeholders, may object to the loan as
distortive of markets. See, e.g., GMAC Financial Services and the Troubled Asset Relief
Program: Hearing on S. 111-462 Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 2d Sess.
(2010) (explaining that other leasing and auto companies complained when General Motors
Acceptance Corp. [“GMAC”] was allowed to become a bank holding company because the
now-bank’s lower cost of funding allegedly subsidized auto sales at General Motors and
Chrysler); The Unique Treatment of GMAC Under the TARP: Cong. Oversight Panel, March
Oversight Report (Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing the bail-out of GMAC due to GM’s financial
ties to the bank holding company). See also Liam Plevin & Sudeep Reddy, AIG’s Rivals
Blame Bail-out For Tilting Insurance Game, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123776549185209083
[https://perma.cc/T8M7-4CX3]
(noting the complaints of competing insurance companies that post-rescue AIG was able to
offer below-market discounts on some products because of cheap cost of capital). 
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(such as being an insider). There is a large body of codified and common
law that restricts disguised loan-to-own facilities, roll-ups, and other DIP
conditions intended to protect more than a lender’s narrow economic
interest in the rescue loan. There are also explicit and implicit limits on
using a DIP loan to control a plan process or allocate value, including
restrictions on forcing quick asset sales and taking liens on avoidance
actions.51 Creditors may relinquish plan value, but in some jurisdictions,
may not gift plan value in violation of absolute priority. Generally, postpetition value transfer outside of a bankruptcy plan in exchange for a plan
vote is highly suspect and likely prohibited.52
51. See, e.g., In re TMT Procurement Corp.,764 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2014)
(discussing “fraud, collusion between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an
attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders” as “misconduct that would
destroy a purchaser’s good faith status”); In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania Inc., 788 F.
2d 143 (3rd Cir. 1986) (discussing factors that would prevent a finding of good faith for a
“loan-to-own” DIP); In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
DIP lender acted in bad faith because financing was intended for the improper purpose of
paying creditor legal fees); In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 824 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2009) (setting forth nine criteria used to evaluate requests for expedited sale of estate
assets). Compare In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 58 B.R. 357, 358 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1986) (holding that “neither a trustee in bankruptcy, nor a debtor-in-possession, can assign,
sell or otherwise transfer the right to maintain a suit to avoid a preference”) with In re
Qualitech Steel Corp., 351 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing lien on avoidance action to
secure DIP financing where there is benefit to the estate). See also American Bankruptcy
Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012-2014 Final Report and
Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 67-87 (2015) (discussing current law
and setting forth recommendations and findings with respect to terms and timing of
approval of post-petition financing, liens on proceeds of avoidance actions, and a delayed
timeframe for sale of estate assets outside of the plan process).
52. Gifting of recovery is an issue that comes up in many bankruptcy cases. It is wellunderstood that a consenting senior class may give up value to the proximate junior class,
typically done to buy peace. Not all courts agree on whether or on what terms a senior class
may gift recovery to classes more junior than proximate over the objection of the
intermediate class. Some courts have taken the practical view that if intermediate classes
are not entitled to distributional recovery then they should not be heard to complain about
how the senior creditor spends its recovery, at least in Chapter 7 liquidation. See, e.g., In re
SPM Mfr. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1316-19 (1st Cir. 1993) (gifting by a fulcrum secured
creditor in the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation is permissible). Other courts take the view
that nonconsensual gifting over the proximate class should be difficult or prohibited, as a
violation of the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11. See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634
F.3d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing SPM in the Chapter 11 context and holding that
the absolute priority rule does not allow for “any exception for ‘gifts’”); see also In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) (gifting property to junior
classes over objections from more senior classes violates the absolute priority rule). Though
different than a gifting objection, similarly situated creditors also can complain about unfair
discrimination and disparate treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), the same Bankruptcy
Code “cram-down” provision that establishes the absolute priority rule. Id. Whether
settlement distributions inconsistent with the Code’s statutory priority scheme can be fair
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Other parts of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules also are designed to
expose identity-based conflicts of interest and to determine ulterior
motives. A creditor voting on a plan of reorganization with a motive other
than its own self-interest may find its vote “designated” under Bankruptcy
Code section 1126(e) and not counted.53 Insiders who make preferential
transfers are treated adversely relative to third parties who engage in the
exact same conduct.54 Even the seemingly pedestrian Rule 2019 statement,
which requires greater disclosure of economic interests held by groups than
required to show standing, is designed in part to allow the court and other
parties to understand biases and motives.55
It is very difficult to apply these existing rules and standards to a loan
deliberately structured by the lender to cause self-detriment and which is
managed for a non-economic purpose. Other than in the few cases in
which an individual or small group acts in a particularly malicious fashion
to destroy value, there is little opportunity for the courts to consider how a
commercial actor might purposefully engage in non-economic behavior. A
private actor analogue to government lending might be a non-profit group
that provides rescue funds to a disfavored company on excellent terms, not
and equitable is likely to be addressed by the Supreme Court in the October 2016 term. See
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. accepted, Czyzewski, et al. v.
Jevic Holding Corp. et al. (Sup. Ct. 15-649) (seeking to resolve a circuit split over the
authority of a bankruptcy court to dispose of claims and distribute assets through a
structured dismissal that essentially substitutes a settlement agreement for a plan of
reorganization).
53. See, e.g., In re Fed. Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that “each
creditor is expected to cast his vote in accordance with his perception of his own selfinterest, but he may not act with an ulterior or coercive purpose”); In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.,
634 F.3d at 102-04 (summarizing Section 1126(e) and holding that an indirect business
competitor could not vote its claim for the purpose of blocking any plan that did not convey
an ownership interest in the reorganized business); see also In re Dune Deck Owners Corp.,
175 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing “badges of bad faith”); see also In re
Circus & Eldorado Joint Venture, No. 12-51156, (Bankr. D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2012)
(designating votes where the creditor’s true intention was to acquire operating ownership of
the debtor); see generally Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Voting and the Designation
Power, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155 (2013) (describing how courts can consider motives and
implement procedural safeguards when confronted by creditors not voting to maximize
claim recovery in Chapter 11 filings).
54. See 11 U.S.C. §547(b) (extending the bankruptcy preference period from 90 days
to one year for insiders). Likewise, insider status can lower the burden of proof needed to
equitably subordinate a claim under Bankruptcy Code § 510(c)(1). In re Epic Capital Corp.,
307 B.R. 767, 772 (D. Del. 2004). Moreover, insider status can be a “badge of fraud”
supporting an inference of intent to make a fraudulent transfer. MFS/Sun Life Trust-High
Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding insider status to be probative of fraudulent intent).
55. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019; see also Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos
Claimants Comm., 321 B.R. 147, 168 (D. N.J. 2005) (holding that one purpose of the rule is
“to root out conflicts of interest”).
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explicitly in order to loan-to-own, but with the knowledge that if it gained
control it would shut the company down. A superficially similar situation
would be a union or pension fund that provides financing under the
condition that labor contracts and pension obligations are not rejected –
essentially a roll-up of unsecured claims – under threat of strike. It is not
clear whether or to what degree a court would examine ulterior motive in
these examples if faced with a competing DIP proposal and an objection.
However, restructuring financing offered by a private lender who acts with
ulterior motive can be subject to increased judicial review, and
categorically rejected by that court, the borrower, or other economic
stakeholders.
The other big difference is that a private lender DIP would be subject
to market testing, a normal requirement in the bankruptcy process.56 In the
private lender context, the failure of a full marketing process for alternative
financing can be probative of a market view that the private DIP loan is on
market terms and equitable. This inference is plausible so long as the
amount to be funded feasibly could be raised in the bank or capital markets
and adjustments are made for structural and procedural advantages or
disadvantages of prospective lenders. In any particular case the inference
may be improper but across cases errors will cancel out and on average the
inference is sensible. For the public lender, however, shopping the loan
and proving lack of market alternative does nothing but check the box that
typical process was followed, and diminishes investor confidence by
rendering a generally effective practice perfunctory. For particularly large
enterprises requiring large amounts of reorganization financing, it already
is the case that alternative financing is not available because the
government is the only entity with the capacity to lend.57 The construct that
56. See Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434, 458 (1999) (ruling that a bankruptcy court should not approve arrangements “untested
by competitive choice”).
57. In addition to exigent circumstances, scale of borrowing, and inadequate time, it
may also be the case that the government is in a preferential position to provide financing
and/or is discouraging private capital formation. The experimenter affects the experiment.
A lender who is also a regulator, or who will receive special consideration from a party that
can affect enterprise value, is at less risk of capital loss because that lender can limit
business risk of the borrower using regulatory power. Conversely, a private lender risks
destruction of value due to regulatory action. For some businesses, the government, in its
many forms, has authority to create or destroy enterprise value (e.g., banking, insurance or
energy), or may even have the power directly to set market terms (e.g., utility rates, or gfees and loan standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). It can gently or not so gently
stamp “approved” or “rejected” on a sale transaction, or pass new legislation or regulation to
control the business. It is not necessary that the government intends to disadvantage private
DIP lenders or purchasers, only that there is perceived risk. Anyone who doubts the
government can affect value post-deal should ask shareholders of defunct savings and loans
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a government DIP is evaluated the same way as a private DIP is stilted
since only the private DIP realistically is subject to market testing.
B. State corporations law
Similarly, state corporations law often applies different rules to
different actors based on the same conduct. For example, a stakeholder
may be invested with a fiduciary duty owed to minority stakeholders as a
consequence of exercising actual control over a corporation, or simply by
owning too large a stake and creating a presumption of control. The same
related party transaction that escapes review entirely under Delaware law if
undertaken by a small, disinterested stakeholder might be subject to a
rigorous “entire fairness” review if undertaken by a controlling stakeholder,
a distinction that is based on the identity and prior conduct of the actor.58 It
is no surprise that the government routinely disclaims voting rights
normally associated with a controlling equity interest and warrants (taken
as a rescue consideration) to avoid designation as a controlling
stakeholder.59
State corporations law offers other stakeholder checks and balances.
Private lenders or borrowers are subject to suit for breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, and any other cognizable claim, under commonplace
standards of review. Government actors taking materially identical
financial or commercial actions may be entitled to jurisdictional protections
against court review (over and above the substantial statutory protections in
favor of a government agency acting as conservator or receiver for a

to describe the effect of reversal of acquisition accounting treatment for supervisory
goodwill. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 861-65 (1996) (describing how
government regulators changed accounting rules to the detriment of bank acquirers that
relied on prior guidance).
58. See, e.g., Hamilton Partners v. Highland Capital Mgmt., No.CIV.A. 6547-VCN,
2014 WL 1813340, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2014) (explaining that the court uses the
standard of entire fairness, the most rigorous standard, when reviewing stockholder
challenges to the fairness of a merger between corporations and their respective controlling
stockholders). Federal law makes similar distinctions based on insider status. See, e.g.,
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (setting forth the
“short-swing profit rule” that requires insiders to forfeit profits from the purchase and sale
of securities within a six-month period).
59. For a discussion about the duties of controlling shareholders under Delaware law
and the difficulties in holding a controlling government shareholder accountable under
Delaware law, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the Controlling
Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010) (arguing that the
Delaware courts should not entertain controlling shareholder disputes involving federally
controlled Delaware corporations and that abstention better protects the State’s role in
setting corporate law).
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borrower).60 A complainant against the government also must find a way
around sovereign immunity, whether under the APA, Federal Tort Claims
Acts, the Tucker Act, or otherwise. That complainant then faces a multiyear legal battle, only to have government conduct likely judged under a
more deferential standard of review than conduct of a private actor.61
Moreover, if the government were just a private actor, it would be
reasonable to expect the board of directors or management of the distressed
corporation to negotiate on behalf of the enterprise and existing
stakeholders. In the public rescue context, “approval” of the board does
nothing except add a veneer of legitimacy to government actions.62 At one
extreme, the board may be effectively replaced by an appointed
government official and immunized against claims for breach of fiduciary
duty for acquiescing to appointment.63 Judicial immunity aside, there may
be significant regulatory arm-twisting or pressure on a board or
60. Review assumes in the first instance that the court is not statutorily divested of
jurisdiction to evaluate government or debtor conduct or enjoin objectionable conduct. See
supra note 26 (discussing that courts are routinely divested of authority to restrain or affect
actions taken by agencies pursuant to statute).
61. See footnote 34, supra. For a discussion of the differing standards of review for
evaluating regulatory takings (i.e., assuming waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491), see also James E. Holloway and Donald C. Guy, Weighing
the Need to Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review
and Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, (2010) (evaluating Takings
Clause doctrine and, particularly, the fairness and justice doctrine).
62. In addition, extraordinary corporate transactions often need to be approved by
shareholders, and not just agreed to by management or the board of directors (who
theoretically can be coerced by a majority stakeholder or the government). Shareholders
may be able to adjust consideration paid for their stakes, provided that the manner of
financing transaction requires shareholder approval and that shareholders retain rights to
disapprove the proposed transaction. To wit, common shareholders in Bear Stearns caused
JP Morgan to raise its government-assisted acquisition bid from $2 per share to $10 per
share by threatening not to approve required issuance of dilutive shares.
See
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/2WGF-NMYY]; see also In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig.,
supra note 36, (describing the corporation’s law dispute and requirement for issuance of
new shares). Shareholder control rights notionally continue to exist in Chapter 11
bankruptcy, although control rights are severely circumscribed in application. See Thomas
G. Kelch, Shareholder Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage
of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. L. REV. 264 (1993) (challenging the accepted view of
shareholder rights in Chapter 11 bankruptcies). Under Dodd-Frank and similar restructuring
regimes the conservator or receiver succeeds to all shareholder control rights, see supra note
26, and there is no need even to seek consent from affected economic stakeholders.
63. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(12) (2013)
(providing protection from liability for directors who acquiesce in good faith to the
appointment of a resolution authority, such as a conservator or receiver); see also Housing
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(6) (2008) (protecting directors
under these circumstances as well); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5387(2010) (providing the same protection for directors).
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management to accept funding.64 And, even if free to act, it would be the
rare director or manager, protected from most censure by the business
judgment rule, who would reject government funds with alacrity and force.
It is unrealistic for market participants to expect public funds to be declined
by boards, whatever the terms, because the ultimate check on rescue lender
overreach – alternative financing – is missing.
The point of highlighting distinctions based on identity,65 and of
illustrating judicial examination of motive and bias of a private actor, is not
64. For example, some banks allegedly were strong-armed into selling senior preferred
shares to the government in 2008. Among other things, by accepting funds under the TARP
Capital Purchase Program, these banks were forced to issue common stock warrants and
became subject to restrictions on executive pay, dividends, and redemption of junior
interests (something government agencies had difficulty accomplishing in their regulatory
capacity). The account of the “October meeting” at the offices of the Treasury was widely
reported. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Jon Hilsenrath & Deborah Solomon, At Moment of
Truth, U.S. Forced Big Bankers to Blink, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122402486344034247
[https://perma.cc/SFN9-YY7M]
(describing a meeting where the government offered to take a non-negotiable $125 billion
stake in the nation’s big banks and imposed new restrictions on executive pay and dividend
policies); see also Application Guidelines for TARP Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEPT.
OF
TREASURY (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARPPrograms/bank-investment-programs/cap/Documents/application-guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK29-88SL] (setting forth the conditions with which a financial institution
must comply in order to participate in the Treasury Capital Purchase Program, which
include policies on executive pay and dividends). 
65. Restrictions on conduct based on identity or status also arise under federal antitrust
law. A dominant market participant – which the government plainly is in the context of
emergency financing – may be restricted from engaging in anticompetitive behavior which a
smaller competitor would be allowed or even encouraged to pursue. Antitrust law is also an
area where courts grapple with distinctions between government’s commercial activity and
regulatory activity, in the context of evaluating the government’s market participant
exception to state-action immunity from the antitrust laws. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943) (distinguishing between a market participant role and a regulatory role);
City of Lafayette v. La. P&L Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (holding that an antitrust
exemption is only available with respect to conduct engaged in as an act of government by
the State as sovereign) (Marshall, J., concurring); F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010-11 (2013) (explaining that a sub-state authority acting as a market
participant was not entitled to state-action immunity). Similarly, courts have developed
standards for distinguishing between when the state is acting in a truly sovereign capacity
and when it is acting as an ordinary commercial actor when evaluating the market
participant exception to application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812-13 (1976) (ruling that a state action
that preferences in-state goods and falls within the market participant exception violates
neither the Commerce Clause nor Equal Protection Clause); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 440 (1980) (confirming that state action as a market participant, in this case as a seller
of goods, receives the market participant exception, and thus, its intra-state preferences do
not violate the Commerce Clause); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82, 97-98 (1984) (holding that permissible state preferences under the market-participant
doctrine are limited to the particular market in which it is acting).
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to argue a court should reject a government loan but rather to show the
absence of ordinary checks and balances on government behavior. Strict
adherence to rules and tradition when evaluating the propriety of massive
government intervention may violate the spirit of a thing by following the
letter of it. It would not be inequitable, and it would lessen investor
concerns and market distortion, if the government restricted its own
behavior to better separate its regulatory role from its commercial role.66
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS67

The four proposals set forth below aim to lower uncertainty without
severely restricting government discretion. They are simple and actionable.
The first two limit market distortions by exposing government loans to
market forces. The third proposal addresses potential conflicts of interest
when the government acts as regulator and financier. The fourth proposal
would improve transparency and accountability by restricting
reorganization earmarks. One characteristic shared by the first three
proposals is that they openly acknowledge the potentially conflicting roles
of government as commercial actor and as sovereign. As noted throughout,
uncertainty arises when the government’s initial involvement purports to be
commercial but its aims are policy-based or political and play out over
time.68 These proposals reverse the order of operation by having the
66. One might question the efficacy of self-imposed restrictions, but they can be
effective and legally binding constraints. Agencies can self-restrict, and be bound by their
own precedent. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their
Own Laws, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1985) (discussing “regulatory estoppel” and the
enforcement of an agency’s own rules and laws in federal court); Harold A. Krent,
Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1187, 1212-24 (1997) (discussing judicial oversight and enforcement of
discretionary agency rules). 
67. The focus here is on corporate bail-outs, and excludes consideration of banks and
insurance companies, for two reasons. First, there have been thousands of receiverships or
conservatorships of failed banks and savings institutions under the control of the FDIC, the
FSLIC, and/or the RTC. FDIC pattern and practice is known, and the agency materially has
self-limited its discretion through rules, regulations, and policy statements (the FSLIC
effectively was merged with the FDIC in 1989 and the RTC was dissolved in 1995).
Investors may not always like how banks and thrifts are resolved but the risk that the FDIC
will transfer or liquidate assets at less than reasonably equivalent value is estimable.
Second, insurance companies are state chartered. Despite model laws promulgated by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, each state has a different regulatory and
resolution regime, in practice if not always by statute. Also, for both banks and insurance
companies, the primary expected source for emergency liquidity is pre-established
government funds and credit lines and not private financing. 
68. Here, it is argued that government should not act with the same rights and
perspective as a private lender when providing and setting the terms of post-petition
financing. Ironically, when the government injects capital as a pre-petition investor –
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government enter the market to advance its policy or political aims but then
pivot to a role more closely resembling a commercial actor.
A. Proposal 1: Funded loans and unfunded lines of credit should be
market tested on a vertical slice basis and be offered for public
sale
Non-governmental actors cannot provide rescue funding in the same
size and in the same time frame as the government. Distressed companies
or industries worthy of official intervention typically require massive
injections of funds well beyond the ordinary capacity of private actors in
risk markets. There rarely is time to develop robust private bank and
capital lender syndicates. There often are structural impediments to raising
capital, seemingly mundane but serious (such as the potential absence of
capital market participants willing to accept private information and
therefore be restricted from trading). Private market tolerance for risk also
is pro-cyclical, whereas rescue financing typically needs to be countercyclical to market or industry conditions.
Simply, the slope of the supply curve for massive rescue financing is
nearly vertical at needed quantities in the short-term. Without reaching the
question of whether there is any price for funds at which the market will
clear, it can be stated with confidence that in many cases the clearing price
for private capital will be too high to be useful as rescue financing. That
leaves policymakers who wish to price government loans on “market
terms” in a bit of a conundrum. Comparable private pricing for a loan of
the same size does not exist. Alternatively, pricing could be determined by
formula, based on risk of default, recovery, and estimated risk premium.
This method offers false precision because inputs, particularly estimates of
appropriate risk premium, are highly subjective.69 Both approaches can be
distinguished from when the government intentionally provides a market distortive subsidy
– the major risk is that the government may not act enough like a private actor. When the
state intends to act in an entrepreneurial fashion, with expectations of return on investment,
it should avoid picking winners and losers and creating market distortions. So, for example,
a state-owned pension fund in theory should be mercenary in outlook, insulated from
political influence. Even deliberately subsidized entities, such as the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation or the Export-Import Bank of the United States, should maximize
returns subject to the confines of their investment criteria. Of course, if the government
directly wants to subsidize a business or industry it is free to do so, and to lose money doing
it. For a discussion about state entrepreneurism and some prescriptive suggestions for
reducing market distortions, see Benjamin Templin, The Government Shareholder:
Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010)
(discussing state entrepreneurism and some prescriptive suggestions for reducing market
distortions). 
69. In the ordinary course, it may be effective to estimate risk by modeling cash flows
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combined into a third amalgam, where policymakers simply punt and leave
market terms to be defined by the parties, perhaps in “consultation” with
the Federal Reserve or similar economic bodies, without setting standards
for evaluation or review. In practice, any level ranging from just over
investment-grade pricing to oppressively high could be justified as
“market.”
Basically, there is no empirical method to verify that the government
is providing financing on non-coercive terms commensurate with credit
risk. So, why not lop off zeros instead and price the loan as if it were a size
that could be raised in private markets? It would not be difficult to
estimate a loan size that is generically market equivalent to “very large but
possible,” and the consequences of estimation error are not great (e.g., the
pricing on a $3 billion DIP facility should be relatively close to the pricing
on a $4 billion DIP facility).70 Any risk premium associated with greater
size would be ignored. The government would still be free to charge an
explicit “moral hazard” premium over and above the market base rate.71
and discount rates, and by surveying comparable companies. These methods fail miserably
in times of distress for systemically important companies. A modeler’s cash flow
assumptions will self-referentially depend on whether aid is provided, how much, and for
what purpose. The types of businesses that receive government support tend to be highly
regulated or have operations that depend on good government relations. A private lender
reasonably might see and price risk that the government, in its administrative capacity, will
act in a way that impairs enterprise value needed to repay a private loan. Conversely, a
government lender might reasonably assume policymakers (including in some cases the
same regulatory agency making the loan) would stop short of value-destroying regulation
that would unduly impair the government loan. During market dislocation private risk
capital in small size will be unusually expensive and in large size unavailable, leaving
discount rate and cost of capital modeling assumptions constrained only by a red-faced test.
There rarely are enough data points to justify a comparable company analysis and, when
there are, the controversy typically is whether a bail-out recipient is being subsidized or
penalized against its peers. In any event, because the government either provides
emergency aid in a size not viably raised in private bank or capital markets, or as part of a
cross-industry lending program that no private actor can be expected to fund, there is no
way other than through testimony to object to the government loan. 
70. By analogy, a $10 billion appeals bond might be priceless at the same time a $10
million appeals bond is readily available at a competitive market price. In 1987, Texaco
Inc. was unable to meet a $10 billion supersedeas bond requirement to continue its appeal of
an antitrust verdict entered in favor of the Pennzoil Company. Texaco argued requiring a
bond of that size was fundamentally unfair and violated due process because sufficient
bonding capacity did not exist. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1986) (noting Texaco’s argument that it could not possibly post the mandatory bond
given its estimate that “world-wide surety bond capacity ranges from $1 billion to $1.5
billion under the best possible circumstances”), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). Ultimately,
Texaco was forced to file for bankruptcy in order to continue its appeal.
71. There is no conflict with the classic principle that lender-of-last-resort loans should
be made at a penalty rate, only the argument that lending should be made at a base market
rate plus a deliberate, measured, and (optimally) predictable a priori penalty premium. It

2016]

GOVERNMENT AS RESCUE FINANCIER

89

This change in mindset, which takes squishy issues like fairness and
wealth-maximization off the table, allows for a host of positive changes in
government entry and exit strategies. First, entry pricing would be less
subjective. Authority could be delegated to regulators and technical
experts with greater confidence that loans are on market terms because
market is redefined to be less ambiguous. Market participants would be
more likely to accept pricing as reflective of market conditions. Overall,
cost of funding is more predictable for both government and investors.
From the government’s perspective, optionality is lost but so is the need to
calibrate or defend terms in light of political pressure or based on the
perceived merit of the recipient.
Second, change in mindset allows the government flexibility to craft
funding solutions that lie between providing 100% of rescue funding or
none at all. Every sale or participation of the rescue loan becomes
perfectly commercial; that is, government actors should always be pleased
or at least economically indifferent to laying-off risk at cost. Suppose that
a vertical slice of funded loans, unfunded lines of credit, and attendant
equity consideration were available for sale or participation at par to private
actors, for a reasonable time or continuously. It could mean the financing
arrangement would be tested by competitive choice, if not immediately at
inception then reasonably thereafter. The government would either reduce
the size of its underwriting commitment at the outset, or divest some or all
of its commitment over time. In addition, the government could realize
value from a sale of the strip, which might be more liquid and valuable than
each of the investment tranches sold separately.
There have been some recent attempts to match public rescue dollars
with private market capital, notably the Public-Private Investment Program
(“PPIP”) in 2009.72 A simple and consistent approach that allows private
should not be an amalgamated rate that fails to distinguish risk from penalty. The Federal
Reserve engages in predictable penalty cost “discount window” lending precisely to address
temporary problems banks and other depository institutions may have in obtaining private
funding. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 12, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
bst_lendingdepository.htm [https://perma.cc/23VQ-TXVE] (explaining why the Federal
Reserve has a discount window and illustrating how to set predictable costs for liquidity
financing).
72. It is hard to say whether PPIP was successful or not. On the one hand, the
government did not raise nearly the amount of private capital initially contemplated. At
inception, Treasury allocated $75 billion to $100 billion in TARP funds to the program, to
be matched by an equivalent amount of new private equity capital. Despite generous
subsidies to private investors in the form of non-recourse loans, the program was scaled
back and raised only $7.5 billion in private capital, not nearly enough to be deemed material
when compared with the amount of “toxic” assets on bank balance sheets. See U.S. DEPT.
OF TREAS., TREASURY DEPARTMENT RELEASES DETAILS ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP

90

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19:1

investment alongside the government on parallel terms might raise material
private capital in some cases, and even a non-material but competitive
private investment could be used to set market terms. Even if the entire
construct turns out to be a mostly intellectual exercise and private
investment is de minimis, the practice of excluding inordinate size from
“market terms” would introduce objectivity in setting a market base rate
upon which the government could overlay a fixed “moral hazard”
premium.
B. Proposal 2: All funded debt should be pre-payable, all credit lines
should be cancelable, and if practicable, delivered proceeds should
be callable for a reasonable period of time
There are two cogent objections to allowing unwind of rescue
financing. First, there is a financial cost. Portfolio managers should expect
to have winning and losing investments. To not put too fine a point on it,
winners are expected to pay for losers and the remainder should provide a
positive return over cost of capital. Part of return is realizing on the upside
of investments. That is why callable instruments price at a discount to noncallable instruments. If an investor allows winners to be called-away then
aggregate returns on investment will be lower than initially expected.
However, the government is not a private lender and presumably acts
to stabilize markets and not to maximize wealth. All else equal,
government should seek to socialize rescue costs rather than surcharge one
bail-out recipient to pay for the costs of an unrelated bail-out. Moreover,
the government’s cost of capital is very low, and market risk rates should,
INVESTMENT
PROGRAM
(2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg65.aspx [https://perma.cc/J83U-CVDP] (announcing initial governmental
contributions of TARP fund to PPIP); see also U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., LEGACY SECURITIES
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
INVESTMENT
PROGRAM
(2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/
External%20Report%2013%20-9%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR4F-HWDC] (charting
the underperformance of PPIP). On the other hand, the program was profitable for both
private investors and the government, and there is a case to be made that PPIP was scaled
back because banks were able to raise capital without selling portfolios to the program and
because investors were reluctant to participate in PPIP based on addressable political
concerns rather than financial risk-versus-reward concerns. See Fannie Chen, Structuring
Public-Private Partnerships: Implications from the “Public-Private Investment Program for
Legacy Securities”, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 509, 530 (2013) (outlining several
counterarguments to the position that PPIP’s underperformance was due to financial riskversus-reward concerns, including the political risk concern of private partners). In theory,
it should be easier to raise private funds to purchase top-of-the-capital-stack loans. This is
particularly so if a sale program were properly constructed to adjust for political risk and
compensate for government control over minority investors, and a familiar pricing
mechanism such as Dutch auction were used.
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in theory, allow for positive returns on capital even if average returns
slightly lag. This is particularly true if a rescue loan is provided for
liquidity in a lender of last resort capacity rather than on account of
balance-sheet insolvency. Overall, it should be possible to adjust loan
terms to account for the costs of writing a call or to calibrate the call option
so that government returns are reasonable and reflect market conditions for
callable debt.
Second, allowing a quick unwind of rescue financing also poses a
moral hazard problem. There would be less reluctance to borrow money if
funds could be accepted on onerous terms and then repaid without penalty
when private markets reopen. In addition, there would be incentives to
create value for junior classes using the rescue financing (“other people’s
money”), which is not just a game theory problem but also a potential
political problem. There is no way around moral hazard. It can be limited
through regulation, incentives and penalties, and upfront underwriting
charges (there also would be no assurance that the government would
provide funding in the first instance), but the risk is persistent.
However, dealing with moral hazard is a balancing act.73 Conditions
for borrowing can be set to severely impair existing creditors and interests
but, if value destruction is viewed as excessive by the market, then private
capital for other companies will be more expensive or unavailable.
73. The debate over how to balance moral hazard with fairness and efficiency is an old
one. The restructuring process itself creates moral hazard by allowing a debtor, among
other things, to create involuntary liquidity. Restructuring laws, including the Bankruptcy
Code and similar statutes governing bank and insurance company resolution, create liquidity
by deferring or eliminating cash payment due dates, and by preserving and recovering
company assets that can be used to generate cash inflows. Various sections of the
Bankruptcy Code are designed to create liquidity even without new financing. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (imposing an automatic stay on collection efforts); 11 U.S.C. § 363
(2012) (permitting sale of assets “free and clear” of encumbrances); 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012)
(allowing rejection of executory contracts and leases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (authorizing
avoidance of preferential and fraudulent transfers of property or incurrences of obligation,
including avoidance of liens); 11 U.S.C. § 550 (providing for recovery of already transferred
property). The Bankruptcy Code also encourages new lenders and business counterparties
to provide incremental liquidity. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364 (authorizing new credit secured
by a priming lien); 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 & 507 (conferring administrative expense priority to
claims on account of extension of post-petition credit by vendors and other counterparties).
The same is true for banks and insurance companies. Banks and insurance companies are
highly regulated entities resolved differently than corporate debtors, with regulatory
emphasis on protection of depositors, insureds, and counterparties. Notwithstanding, these
resolution regimes use conceptually similar provisions to provide liquidity indirectly
through preservation of assets or avoidance of obligations, and allow for additional liquidity
by indemnifying post-intervention creditors and purchasers of assets. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §
1811 (2015) (creating the FDIC); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7401 (McKinney 2015) (governing
rehabilitation, liquidation, conservation and dissolution of insurers at the state level in New
York).
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Similarly, there is a hidden cost when government financing is not
repayable, whether financing legally is non-call or as a practical matter
cannot be repaid without government consent. Private lenders are less
willing to provide pre-petition emergency financing if a subsequent
government loan might irrevocably impair recovery. Also, private actors
have less incentive to arrange post-petition replacement financing because
there is no contractual right to take out the government lender.
Fundamentally, the balancing act comes down to the character of
government as a lender of last resort. If the goal of intervention is
stabilization, and to allow markets time to create alternative sources of
liquidity, unwinding rescue financing is not a public nuisance. At least in
the abstract it is hard to argue against repayment with private funding as an
aspirational goal.74
As a discussion piece (no size fits all), suppose that a government loan
can be unwound for 12 months after lending, and that at any time, funded
debt can be repaid and the loan facility cancelled. Would there truly be
harm if existing lenders or an alternative private syndicate were able to
substitute in whole or in part for the government? The government would
recover par plus on its funded investment, and would be off the hook to the
extent the facility is replaced and commitment reduced. If the government
received non-cash proceeds as a facility fee (e.g., common stock or
warrants), then those proceeds would be callable at a market price set when
the loan was made. If the government still holds the proceeds then they
would be called, and if proceeds were delivered away in the interim then a
call is impractical. Such a repayment option, or any variant thereof, would
act as a procedural safety valve. If the government is using contract
leverage to influence corporate governance or the restructuring process,
then one of the easiest ways to address conflict of interest is to take out the
financing.75
74. Apart from there being better uses of taxpayer resources than funding enterprises
able to fund elsewhere, consider also that government may have a policy interest in creating
lending programs that are both palatable and available to relatively healthy institutions, so as
not to stigmatize recipients. Forcing an institution to take government funds on unrepayable
terms may signal just the sort of non-temporary distress that causes private capital to run.
75. Banks technically were permitted to repay loans offered through the TARP Capital
Purchase Plan but repayment initially was discouraged by contract (by prohibition on
repayment other than through a qualified equity offering) and subsequently by the
requirement that banking regulators specifically approve repayment. The paradigmatic
example of an unpayable loan is the facility offered to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
government has taken the position that neither company may repay its loans despite having
repaid in “dividends” more than was actually borrowed from the government, and despite
alleged feasibility of raising sufficient private funds. See merits briefing submitted in Perry
Capital, LLC, et al. v. Lew, DC Appeals Court 14-5243 (on appeal from Perry Capital, LLC,
et al. v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.D.C. 2014)) (stating “[a]nd, even though the
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C. Proposal 3: The government should assign an impartial investment
manager to make commercial decisions with respect to each rescue
financing
This proposal addresses the “two-hat” conflict of interest problem
directly. With respect to rescue financings, each government agency or
organization should be required to designate a commercial manager
primarily responsible for taking the lead in commercial discussions,
reasonably defined. The commercial manager would not directly supervise
or regulate entities associated with the specific financing transaction, and
would wear only a commercial hat.76 The commercial manager would have
authority to make decisions related to the terms and conditions of lending,
subject to policy or political override by the agency. Authority would not
be limited to monitoring conditions and participating in the deliberative
process.
Instead, business decisions by the commercial manager would stand
unless overruled by the agency. Deliberative process unambiguously
would allow for overruling the commercial manager or adjusting outcomes
on otherwise valid policy or political grounds. However, overruling a
decision would reflect a conscious choice to wear a regulatory hat,
documented and reviewable as regulatory action. Essentially, valid
government policy options would not be restricted, but would have to be
independently justified.
The commercial manager could be part of a separate cross-agency
organization or be separated by an ethical wall from the part of the agency
that makes the loan or which regulates the recipient’s industry. A separate
organization with the sole purpose of managing government investments in
a commercially reasonable manner might be superior to an ethical wall
because of clear demarcation of responsibilities and reporting lines,
standardization (and predictability) of government behavior, and desirable
tension and checks between and among government officials. On the other
hand, it would be difficult to ensure political independence of a separate
organization and purported impartiality could be a mere fig leaf, industry
expertise and experience is likely to be greater within the funding agency,
and it might be an insurmountable political step for an agency to relinquish
Companies have repaid Treasury’s investment in full plus $43 billion, FHFA will have the
Companies pay an additional $153 billion to Treasury over the next decade, and Treasury’s
liquidation preference will remain unchanged at $189 billion”).
76. Ideally, the lead advisory person would be a disinterested government employee or
consultant with market experience, gravitas, and reputational risk, who could freely
participate in the deliberative process. Such a person or group could be very influential,
much like an independent director who cannot carry a board vote but punches above weight.
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control to an outsider. There are arguments in favor of and against variants
of either approach, but the key is that an identified commercial manager
would set default business terms and conditions.77
The process whereby the government provides or arranges rescue
financing would have to be flexible enough to allow for emergency funding
and exigent circumstances. In practice, over-the-weekend-type bail-outs
likely would be fully consummated in essentially the same manner as
today. However, companies can be in conservatorship, receivership,
bankruptcy, or teetering distress for extended periods of time, and
emergency funding often is staged. To the extent time permits, commercial
managers could negotiate undefined market terms and conditions,
implement second-stage transactions, and evaluate requests for
amendments, waivers, and exits, among other things. In addition, the
commercial manager could serve a signaling function, and could receive
and respond to comments, concerns, and complaints of commercial
overreach. This would improve transparency for both investors and
legislators. Also, because investor interactions with agencies often are
highly politicized, both investors and agencies might benefit from a
deliberately depoliticized, more “technical” method of communication.
When the government acts only as the lender, the perfect should not
be made the enemy of the good. Commercial manager functions and
independence can and should vary depending on the nature of financial
assistance. However, when the government acts on both sides of the rescue
transaction, it is absolutely critical for market confidence that a truly
disinterested commercial actor controls negotiations on behalf of the
recipient entity. Issues of self-dealing and conflicts of interest are
77. Agencies routinely task a person or group to solicit opinions and gather
information about the market and commercial reasonableness, and to make
recommendations to final decision-makers. Decision-making processes can range from
real-time, informal deliberations to unhurried and structured presentations at formal
meetings, even at the same agency. Accordingly, agencies might offer in response to this
suggestion that they already differentiate between commercial and regulatory functions
when appropriate. Apart from the observation that current practice might be a useful guide
to determine the manner in which commercial managers would be appointed, there are three
problems unaddressed by this response. First, there is a qualitative difference between
recommendations made to an agency head or board that reserves all decision-making
authority and recommendations that are self-effectuating unless overruled. Second, ad hoc
processes tend towards result-oriented analyses and lead to unpredictable signaling to
investors. Third, by leaving ambiguity about whether agency actions were regulatory or
commercial in nature (or both) the agency retains optionality to choose or change
justifications if challenged. Agencies presumably want to preserve optionality, like most
strategic actors, but from an investor and government oversight perspective the ability to
change rationales after-the-fact undeservedly expands agency discretion.
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unavoidable when any party, public or private, negotiates both sides of a
commercial transaction. The market will not accept that agencies
ostensibly negotiating against each other truly are adverse, regardless of
stated agendas or nominal reporting lines. Nor will the market accept that
the agency acting as conservator or receiver is immune to political pressure
and extra-agency control. Further, even if the conservator or regulator
walks with the angels, there is no way for investors to assess how the
agency balanced regulatory concerns and commercial concerns.
Statutory resolution schemes such as HERA and Dodd-Frank
expressly provide for government actors to make business decisions
ordinarily made by private management, directors, and shareholders, with
limited or no judicial review, and limited or no recourse for perceived
malfeasance. Statutory priority schemes and pre-failure government
guidance may help to mitigate risk, but it is the exercise of agency
discretion that ultimately drives outcome. Investors face risk that corporate
agents cannot or will not protect stakeholder interests and that regulatory or
political concerns will upend long-standing expectations about recovery,
timing and process.
Commercial negotiations between the Federal Housing Finance
Authority (“FHFA”) and Treasury over how to fund Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are a case in point. The dispute over the legality and propriety
of the August 2012 “Net Worth Sweep” turns in large part on whether the
FHFA acted to preserve and conserve estate assets in its capacity as
conservator (i.e., commercial conduct) or whether the Net Worth Sweep
pretextually advanced a regulatory or self-interested government agenda
though contract. More simply, would a disinterested conservator motivated
to preserve estate assets have agreed to the Net Worth Sweep? Some
investors perceive that the Net Worth Sweep would have been rejected or
materially changed had the FHFA negotiated contractual terms as an
independent and disinterested commercial actor.
Regardless, from a market perspective, whether the FHFA exceeded
statutory authority, made arbitrary and capricious decisions, breached
fiduciary duties, caused breaches of contract, or acquiesced to regulatory
takings, all are matters that relate to commercial independence and selfdealing. Even today, it is hard to see how the FHFA director, wearing both
a regulatory and commercial hat, impartially could consider proposals to
preserve or raise capital at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or continue to
negotiate opposite Treasury. FHFA appointment of an independent and
disinterested commercial manager, ethically bound to consider options only
from estate perspectives, would reduce actual or perceived conflicts of
interest.
It also would improve transparency and accountability,
particularly if FHFA’s conflicting role as commercial manager actually
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were delegated to a third-party operating under clear instructions. With
billions of dollars and market confidence at stake, there are strong reasons
why an agency in effective control of a bail-out recipient should appoint a
disinterested manager to represent the interests of the estates and
stakeholders.
Going forward, it is much more likely the government will participate
on both sides of a rescue transaction, and that the lines between regulatory
conduct and commercial conduct will be blurred. Dodd-Frank emphasizes
the purpose of receivership as “stability” and furtherance of the public good
in a way not similarly emphasized in the FDIA or HERA,78 and a receiver
exercising orderly liquidation authority may argue there is express statutory
support for a receiver to consider regulatory objectives. An FDIC rule that
limits the terms and conditions of funds provided to the covered company
would be welcomed by investors. The FDIC also may very well end up
negotiating rescue financing terms on behalf of subsidiaries not in
receivership, and guidelines for management of subsidiaries also would be
welcome. Finally, there is no reason to believe government intervention
authorized in as-yet-unwritten legislation would seek to separate
commercial and regulatory functions, and recent trends imply the opposite.
It may be that the appointment of a commercial manager would not
change agency behavior. Worse, it is possible that endorsement of bail-out
terms and conditions by a commercial manager would validate agency
actions even if the manager were not truly disinterested. On the other hand,
agency optionality comes at a high cost, diffuse and difficult to quantify in
the absence of a crisis, and concentrated and pro-cyclically damaging in a
crisis. All else equal, disinterested exercise of discretion will lower the
cost of capital, and interested exercise of discretion will increase the cost of
capital or render capital unavailable at a useful cost. Investors and
ultimately the government would benefit if commercial terms could be set
in a more predictable, transparent and accountable process, by a
disinterested actor.
D. Proposal 4: Reorganization earmarks should be subject to the
political process
The likelihood that a private creditor will transfer value for a purpose
other than its own pecuniary interest is low. On the other hand, the
government may have valid policy or political reasons to “earmark” value
78. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5386 (2010) (stating that “[i]n taking action under this title,
the Corporation shall (1) determine that such action is necessary for purposes of the
financial stability of the United States, and not for the purpose of preserving the covered
financial company”).
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in favor of preferred stakeholders, counterparties, or labor. Direct transfers
of value include new money distributions, gifting of recovery, and
adjustment of recovery accomplished through control over process.
Indirect transfers of value include company failure to enforce rights,
purchase of assets at an inflated price, and forced assumption of liabilities,
among other methods.
Two of the most troubling bail-outs in the financial crisis were the
rescues of Chrysler and General Motors. The most cogent legal objections
raised in those bankruptcies concerned lightning-quick Section 363 sales of
all operations to shell corporations, both on procedural grounds and with
respect to valuation. Less cognizable, but more easily understood, were
objections that the government used the bankruptcy process and its
checkbook to benefit preferred constituencies, namely union employees
and retirees. At a minimum, DIP terms forced the purchasing shell
companies to assume union contract and pension liabilities that some
argued should be rejected. There also were allegations that preferred
creditors received plan distributions in excess of legal entitlement, as a
consequence of DIP terms.79
Whether the reorganization earmarks in Chrysler and General Motors
bankruptcy were legal and appropriate is beside the point. Market
perception of many was that the reorganization earmarks were not in
accord with ordinary rules governing priority of recovery and distribution
to similarly-situated classes of creditors. That future reorganization
earmarks, the size and scope of which are beyond the predictive ability of
investors, similarly would be legally approved or unreviewable is the
source of market uncertainty and concern.
A government policy to self-restrict reorganization earmarks would
add value for investors and address political concerns.80 Banning
79. See Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed
from Prior Practice, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 399, 428 (2013) (discussing the differences
between the Chrysler reorganization and previous section 363 sales in its benefit to labor
unions and pension plans over other investors); see also A. Joseph Warburton,
Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 531, 548-51 (2010) (explaining that critics of the Section 363 sales in both the
Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcy proceedings focused on its preference to the
company’s unions over investors).
80. Reorganization earmarks pretextually created through a commercial relationship
suborn the political process and may lead to outcomes deeply inconsistent with prior
legislative pronouncements (e.g., preferential payments to pensioners may undercut the
deliberate congressional mandate to rank pension deficiency claims pari passu and not
ahead of other general unsecured claims in bankruptcy). Checks and balances normally at
play during an appropriations or policy debate are missing, political costs are reduced or
eliminated, and the administrative decision-making process is not transparent. Essentially, it
is difficult or impossible to hold a regulator or administrator specifically accountable for the
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reorganization earmarks is politically unrealistic and may be unworkable,
but an internal policy that calls for review of commercial transactions to
identify, highlight, and justify reorganization earmarks on a policy basis
would be very valuable. The jaundiced view is that such a policy would be
dead-letter because it would be ignored or only superficially followed, and
would be yet another elevation of form over substance to create the illusion
of meaningful process. The more nuanced view is that such a pre-existing
rule could influence decision-makers, improve predictability, give political
cover to deny requests for value, and reduce lobbying. Both investors and
the body politic would be better served if reorganization earmarks were
called out as political and not commercial conduct.
CONCLUSION
Although investors acknowledge the inevitability that government will
seek to implement policy through deal-making and delegation to agencies,
they struggle to price the uncertainty this introduces. There is no way to
eliminate ad hoc approaches to government intervention as each crisis is
new, each company is different, and rubrics about whether and why to
intervene can determine how to price and manage investments once made.
Nor is it clear that public policy would always be served by rigid adherence
to pre-existing rules and prior conduct. Still, rules of general application
can be constructed in light of noncontroversial goals such as transparency,
accountability, and predictability. Incremental steps can be taken to delink
policy or political objectives from the terms, conditions, and management
of commercial rescue loans.
Existing law and practice may lead to suboptimal results with respect
to non-bank reorganization financings by the government. Unpredictable
government use of contractual leverage to accomplish policy or political
goals plainly upsets investor expectations, creating distortion of capital
markets and dead-weight losses, and ironically increases the likelihood and
magnitude of future bail-outs by discouraging private risk-taking by wouldbe rescue lenders. Agencies naturally want to preserve decision-making
optionality, but failure to acknowledge and separate commercial and
regulatory agendas also makes it more difficult for the government to
intervene without creating market distortion, or to distinguish relatively
public policy decision to confer value because that action is analyzed under the rubric of
commercial activity. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009) (noting
that “[g]overnment by deal is not open government, and it rejects some of the usual values
of administrative law, such as predecision notice to affected parties and the public;
measured, unhasty action; and comment-ventilated policymaking”).
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inoffensive injections of liquidity from highly distasteful injections of
capital on account of balance-sheet insolvency.
From a market perspective it appears that there has been vigorous
debate and discussion about government intervention up until the moment
it is decided a check should be cut. However, there has been insufficient
focus on agency conflict of interest, transparency and accountability.
Reorganization loans should be unpleasant to the borrower and its
stakeholders but terms and management of such loans should be designed
to encourage private capital formation. Even when legally permissible,
regulating under the façade of protecting a pecuniary interest should be
seen as suspect and potentially counterproductive. A good approach is to
self-limit agency discretion to make resolution processes more predictable
and certain.

